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India's incentive  system  heavily  favors  manufacturing  and  dis-
criminates against agriculture.  This proposed reform agenda
would remove major policies  that distort agricultural  imports,
exports, inputs, and domestic markets.  It would protect low-
income groups  against  necessary  increases  in food prices.
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NIO-023,  extension  37947 (44 pages, September  1993).
in July 1991,  India embarked  on a program  of  * Initially,  allowing  the export  only of high-
econormic  decontrol  that greatly speeded  the  quality,  high-priced  varieties  of such commodi-
previously  slow process  of liberalizing  trade and  ties as cotton ani rice, to limit upward  pressures
domestic  regulatory  controls  begun in 1978.  But  on domestic  prices of lower-quality  varieties,
the focus of reform  has been  on manufacturing.  which are important  to consumption  in low-
Reformn  has barely touched  agriculture,  which  income  Indian  households.
accounts  for two-thirds  of employment  in India
and about  30 percent  of India's GDP.  * Liberalizing  fertilizer  imports  and
deregulating  domestic  manufacturing  and the
Although  some crops (notably  oilseeds)  distribution  of fertilizers.
receive  heavy protection,  the net effect of
interventions  to date is to heavily  favor manufac-  *  Removing  subsidies  on irrigation,  electric-
turing  over agriculture.  In this agenda  for reform,  ity, and credit (and creating  conditions  to facili-
Pursell and Gulati  recommend:  tate the trading  of canal irrigation  water  rights).
- Removing  all quantitative  export  and import  * Deregulating  the wheat,  rice, sugar,  cotton,
controls  on agriculture,  except for special  and edible  oil and oilseed  industries,  and abolish-
treatment  (such as export taxes)  when Indian  ing compulsory  government  acquisition  at
expol-t would be substantial  enough  to depress  below-market  prices of sugar,  molasses,  and
worid prices  (most likely with rice).  milled  rice.
* Further reducing  protection  on manufactur-  * Reforming  the food security  system to
ing, rather than bringing  protection  for agriculr  protect low-income  groups from the increase  in
ture up to the same level.  the general  level of food  prices required  by the
liberalization  of agriculture.  This would  involve
* As a transitional  measure,  consider:ng  the  better targeting  of food subsidies  and associated
use of variable  tariffs based on weighted  aver-  reforms  of the public  distribution  system,  or even
ages of past intemational  prices as a way to  its eventual  replacement  b) a food stamp  system.
parlSy  insulate  domestic  prices  from extreme
fluctuations  in world prices.
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Introduction
Beginning in July  1991, the Indian govermnent embarked on  a program of  economic
decontrol  which greatly speeded  up the slow process of economic  liberalisation  that had been under
way since about 1978. The stabiiisation  program adopted at the same time, and particularly the
devaluation  and floating of the Rupee, has had indirect effects on the whole economy including
agriculture. But the focus of the specific reforms has been almost entirely  on manufacturing,  with
the abolition  of most of the stifling system of industrial licensing, the removal of import licensing
from nearly all manufactured intermediate goods and capital goods, tariff reductions and the
relaxation  of the rules regulating  foreign investment.  By contrast,  very little of the reform effort  has
so far been directed towards agriculture,  even though the agricultural  sector in India is quite large,
accounting  for two thirds of the employed  population  and about 30 percent of GDP.  As we believe
that extending  the liberalisation  process to Indian  agriculture  has the potential to greatdy  increase  the
efficiency  and the growth momentum  of the economy  (as has happened  in China), and because  there
is a widening  domestic  public debate on the subject  in Indian academic  journals and  in the media,
we have thought it worthwhile  to set out our ideas in the form of a reform agenda.
To this end, the paper first briefly summarises  previous research on the nature and degree
of govermnent  interventions  in agricultural  markets, and what impact  these interventions  had on the
overall incentives for  agricultural production and on  the relative effective incentives for  the
cultivation of different crops during the  1980s (section 1). It  also suggests what has probably
happened  to these incentives  as a result  of recent policy  changes,  particularly  the devaluation  of July
1991  and the associated  and continuing  liberalising  reforms which have so far  principally affected
manufacturing.  Section It delineates  the broad direction  in which agricultural  policy reforms  ,5ed
to move in the medium  to long run so that the system becomes  more transparent and promotes  both
allocative  and technical efficiency  in the use of scarce resources. In this section  we also attempt to
chalk out details of a strategy that we feel might be politically  feasible in the current environment.
Based on the  experience of other countries and India's experience so far with policy reforms
affecting  manufacturing,  Section Im makes some  suggestions  of a general nature on the tactics of
reform which we hope might be useful for policy makers . And finally, in section  IV, we discuss
some of the likely implications  of this reform agenda, and suggest what could  be done to minimize
its possible adverse effects  on the poor.L  The Exsting Controls  and their bripact on CultIvaors  Jncendlvs
IL1 
All except  a few  agricultural  imports  and exports  are subject  to non-tariff  controls  of one
kind  or another,  including  import  and export  licensing, canaisation'  in which  only  one specified
parastatal  is allowed  to import  or export  the commodity,  and  the use of minimum  export  prices.'
On the import  side the only exception  is pultses,  which  are imported  by private  traders  over a low
tariff (at  present  10%). Agriclwture  was not included  In the trade Ilberalisatlon  measures  taken
during 1991  and 1992,  except  fo. the reiaxation  of some  export  controls  which  in most cases  left
other controls  on the same commodities  in place. At the end of 1992  about  60 agricultural  and
livestock  products  were  subject  to some  form of export  control,  as well  as about  46 manufactred
products,  most  of which  were processed  primary  commoxiities.  in April 1993  a fi-ther range  of
products  was removed  from this list, but  most  products  which  are actually  exported  or which  have
export  potential  either  remain  on the  list and are subject  to various  kinds  of -.  ort control,  or were
removed  from the list but are now subject  to ad hoc export  controls  to be arnounced  in public
notices.
The 1991/92  reforms  reduced  the share  of inrnationally tradeable  GDP subject  to some
form  of quantitative  import  restriction  from  about  93 per cent  at the  end  of 1990  to about  75  per cent
in May 1992.  But  practically  all of this  change  was in m,  for which  the share  of value
added  subject  to QRs  fell from  90  per cent  to about  46 per cent.  By contrast  the share  of agricultural
and  livestock  GDP  subject  to QRs  barely  changed,  from 94 per ceut  before  the reforms  to 93 per
cent  in May 1992.2
.2  Domestic Regguaeor Police
For the most  part domestic  trade in agricultural  commodities  within  India  is not  physically
restricted.  Most  products  are traded  and transported  nationally.  Ihere is excellent  and  up to date
information  on prices  nation  wide, and  private  markets  operate  remarkably  efficienly  considering
the  very considerable  communication,  transport  (notably  the  numerous  municipal  road  tax- "octroi"-
points  ) and other  handicaps  they  face.
Nevertheless,  there  are  a number  of  physical  constrains  on the  free movement  of agricuteural
commodities  and  regulatory  and  other  interventions  which  seriously  distort  domesdc  markets.  There
was no liberalisation  of these controls  during 1991 and 1992 when regulatory  controls over
manufactring  were significantdy  reduced.  These  include:
-The  periodic  physical  botding  up of the  wheat  surpluses  in the  north  west  (Punjab,  Haryana
and western  Uttar  Pradesh)  in order to allow  the Food  Corporation  of India ( PCI) to procure  its
requirements  at the official  procurement  price.
-The "levy  1.ice"  compulsory  acquisition  ) systems  for rice and  sugar which  are used to
obtain  the estimated  govetrnme 'eguirements  for the public  distribution  system  ( PDS)P  and for
buffer  stocking,  an,' which  s%v ..Iy distort  these  two markes.
2-The operations  of the PCI and the PDS and the associated  regulatory controls  implemented
by the Department  of Food and the Deparctmw  of Civil Supplies.  These distort the normal regional
and seasonal  variations  of commodity  prices, prevent  or constrain  efficient  private trading  operations,
and  distort production decisions  by farmers P-r .gards  toth  timing and location. In particular,
because of procurement  prices which are the sane throughout  the year, very large grain deliveries
by farmers in the surplus north west are concentrated  in a highly wasteful  manner into just a few
weeks. There is also a great deal of waste, inefficiency  and overemployment  and large scale rent
seeking (e.g.  about a third of all the wheat, rice and sugar, and over half the edible oils are
estimated  to be diverted from the PDS'.
-Periowic  controls  on the movement  of groundquts and groundnut  oil out of Gujarat.
-Some state level controls, e.g., monopsonistic  purchases of rice by the government in the
Thanjavur  district of Tamil Nadu and of cotton  by the Maharashtra  Federation (often  referred to as
monopoly  procurement  schemes).
-The pervasive controls on the operations  of private traders, including (i) the general ban
(with a few minor exceptions)  on futures trading (ii) inventory control1s  (iii) credit controls.
-Discrimination  by Indian Railways  against private traders in favor of parastatals such as
FCI.
-The regulatory and other activities of the various commodity-specific boards or other
government organisations, e.g.,  the Cotton Corporation of India, the Ministry of Textiles, the
National  Dairy Development  Board, the Jute Corporation  of India,  the Tea, Coffee, and Tobacco
Boards etc.
-Extremely detailed and highly distortive regulation of the sugar industry, both by  the
central government and by the governments  of the main sugar producing  states .
-Price and other regulatory c-rols  over the processing of primary commodities  which
seriously inhibit the efficiency of the 'modem'  sectors of these industries while allowing the
continued existence and/or further development of  inefficient, high cost small-scale processors
which are free of all controls and taxes. Examples:  sugar mill controls and khandsari  units in UP;
price controls  on cotton ginning; controls  over edible oil processing;  controls (the levy system) on
rice milling, etc.
-Subsidies  to farmer cooperative  tradig  and processing  organisations  which make it difficult
or impossible  for private traders or processors  to compete.  Examples:  sugar milling in Maharashtra,
subsidised edible.  oil mills supportod  by the National Dairy Development  Board ( NDDB). Many
"cooperatives"  (e.g., in UP ) are in practice state government  controlled  and managed, and highly
politicized.
L2  hIact  on the Level nd Structure  of Incentives  Before the 1991  Devaluation 6
Before 1991, on the basis of measured  nominal protection (i.e., comparing domestic and
world prices), in the aggregate Indian agriculture was heavily discriminated against relative to
3manufacturing.  This is shown in Fig.  1, which graphs estin-tes  of the weighted average nominal
protection  coefficients  for agriculture  as a whole fo; the 25 years 1964/65  to 1989/90; estimates  of
the weighted average NPCs of manufacturing  for th3 17 years 1970/71  to 1987/88;  and the relative
NPCs of agriculture for the 1970/71 to  1987/88 perik4 obtained by dividing the coefficients of
agriculture  by those of manufacturing.  I On average, during the 17 years for which the comparison
has  been made, the protection level  for agriculture was about half the  protection level for
manufacturing.  The gap widknew  in the early 1970s  as vg icultural  protection  declined  steeply while
manufacturing  protection increased, and during the re' . of the 1970s  the anti-agriculture  bias was
particularly pronounced,  with the average agriculture NPC only about a third of the average NPC
for manufacturing. During the 1980s  until 1987/88  there was a pronounced  trend in the opposite.
direction, with the  average NPC  of  agriculture rising steadJy  and  a  substantial decline in
manufacturing  protection. The decline in manufacturing  nominal  protection  presumably  reflects the
easing of import controls and the liberalisation  of domestic industrial licensing and other controls
on manufacturing  during this period, as well as the slight real appreciation  of the Rupee between
1978/79 and 1983/84. Even so, in 1987/88  a big gap remained, with a nominal  protection rate of
just above  zero for ag.iculture  and almost 50  percent for manufacturing.  After this the average NPC
of agriculture declined along with the Rupee devaluation  which accelerated after 1988,  and an
increasing  trend in world commodity  prices. A corresponding  post 1987/88  series for manufacturing
is not available, but in all likelihood,  owing to the Rupee devaluation,  manufacturing  prices would
have also declined  relative to Rupee denominated  world prices. Whether, compared with 1987/88,
the anti-agriculture  bias of the system would  have increased  or declined  would  largely depend  on the
speed and extent of the upward movement  of domestic agricultural  prices compared to the upward
movement  of domestic  manufactured  goods prices in response  to the devaluing  Rupee.












1965  1970  1975  1980  1985  1990
Nominal  Protection  Coefficient  , value  of output in domestic  prices
value  of output in reference  prices
Note:  References  prices are world prices adjusted for port costs and domestic transport and
marketing costs to  the point at  which the Indian products  do or  would compete
internationally. The aggregation  for agriculture  treats all the aggregated  commodities  as
import substitutes  i.e. it is made on the importable  hypothesis.This finding  of a marked  and  continuing  anti-agricultural  bias  in the incentive  system holds
up after  allowing  for the  effects  of protection  on the  cost  of tradeable  inputs  used  in agriculture,  the
subsidies  to agriculture's  principal  non-tradeable  inputs.  and  the exemption  of agricultural  activities
from corporation  and Income  taxes. Aa  shown  in Table  I:
Table  I  Indicators  of  Incentives  to  Agrliculture  and
Manufa~tuxD
Oumit  a  (adj.  for  a.
tI. ocanp.)
Agriculture  0.88  0.97  0.86  0.97 to  0.90
(1980/81  to 86/87)  1.07*
Manufacturing  1.42  1.44  1.34  n.a.  1.41
(1986/87)
Ratio  Ag/Manuf.  0.62  0.67  0.64  n.a.  0.64
source, Gulati  and Pursell  (1993).
Notes:  NPC-Nomlnia  protection  coefficient
EPC=Effective  protection  coefficient
BSC=Effective  subsidy  coefficient
7  The ESC for agriculture  ranges  from about  0.97 to about 1.07  depending  upon  the
definition of  the  canal irrigation subsidy i.e.,  whether the  cost of  canal
irrigation  includes  operating  and maintenance  (O&M)  expenses  only or the eatmated
annualised  capital  cost of all irrigation  schemes,  as the cost to be recovered  from the
farmers.
-Allowing  for the protection  of tradeable  inputs  reduces  anti-agricultural  bias (in this case
measured  by the  ratio  of the aWegate  effective  protection  coefficient  of agriculture  to the aggregate
effective  protection  coefficient  of manfacurl  by a negligible  amount. For agriculture,  the
principal tradeable  inputs are fertilisers,  farm  achinery,  seeds and pesticides. On average,
agriculture  obtained  its internationally  tradeable  inputs  at less  than  world  prices. This was  entirely
due to fertliser, which  in most  years  was  supplied  to farmers  at prices  well  below  the border  price
plus estimated  delivery  costs  to the farm. The nominal  protection  of farm  machinery  was low  to
moderate  by Indian  standards  (there  is a relatively  efficient  domestic  tractor  and farm machinery
industry)  but nominal  protection  of pestcides  was high.
-Subsidies  to non traded  agricultural  inputs  viz. canal  irrigation,  electricity,  and credit  are
substantial  and  are reflected  in an aggregate  effective  subsidy  coefficient  (ranging  from  0.97  to 1.07,
Sdepending  upon  the definition  of tho  Irrigation  subsidy  adopted)  which  is well above  the aregate
effective  protection coefficient  (0.86).  Even so,  without allowing for any  subsidies  for
manufacturing  and simply comparing  the agriculture  ESC above with the EPC estimsie  for
manufacturing,  the ratio (0.72 to  0.80) stll  indicates  substantial  anti-gricultural blas.  Ithe
comparison  would  be less favorable  for agriculture  if allowance  were made  for the subsidy
squivalent  of the various  forms  of government  support  for the  large  number  of "sick' manufactrin5
firms, and  for loss-making  public  enterprises  which  can  only  continue  to operate  with  such  support
even  though  they  may  not be offitially  defined  as sick.
-The exemption  of agriculture  ftom income  and corporate  taxation  increases  aggregate
incentives  for agriculture  relative  to aggregate  incentives  for mu  ng  to a very minor  extent
by comparison  with  the anti-agricultural  bias resulting  from  trade  policies.
During  the 1980s,  the excess  of the free trade  exchange  rate  over the official  rate increased
from  about  30  percent  at the beginning  of the  decade  tc about  40 to 50  percent  towards  the ed.  The
increasing  prczium reflected  the substantial  increzv in impsot  duty rates  over the period  and the
growing  trade deficie. The discrimination  against  agriculture  iro;  the overvalued  exchange  rate
was  therefore  substantial,  a finding  which  is consistent  with  the  findings  of the  Krueger-Schiff-Valdes
country studies.  10
Within agriculture,  there were large differences  in net incentives  between  crops. At the
official  exchange  rate, as  measured  by the  effective  subsidy  indicator  (which  allows  for  the  protection
of output,  tradeable  inputs  and subsidies  on non traded  inputs)  the Gulati-PurseU  et al research
classifies  the main  crops  broadly  as follows:
NGegatiyeincntive  Rice
Cotton




High  incentives  Oitseeds  incl. coconut/copra
Rubber
Sugarcane






Fruit and  vegetables
6There are no quantitative  incentive  estimates  for livestock and fishing but net incentives  are
probably low.  (Wool is imported without restriction  over a  10 per cent tariff; there are export
controls  on the exports of hides and skins. On the other hand the import  of meat and dairy products
is banned, except for small regulated imports  of powdered milk).
Because  if international  and domestic  trans.nort  and marketing  costs, the measured incentive
level of a crop can be considerably  affected according to whether it is treated as an importable  or
an exportable. For example,  the classification  above is based on wheat as an import substitute, but
in the 1980s the net incentive  to wheat production was quite high if wheat is considered as an
exportable. Treating wheat and rice  as  exportables raises the aggregated incentive level  for
agriculture  as a whole,  but even with this adjustment  it is still well below aggregate incentives  for
manufacturing  .
As noted, these classifications  are in relation to world prices converted at the official
exchange  rate. If the incentives  are considered  in relation  to average manufacturing  incentives  or to
the estimated  free trade exchange  rate, the crops with zero to low positive incentives  are strongly
discriminated against, and the net incentives  to the oilseeds, sugar and rubber are lowered. The
incentives  for oilseeds and sugar in most years were nevertheless  high, even by comparison  with
some of the most highly protected manufacturing  industries.
IA.  the  Strcture  of Incentives  after the July 1991 Devaluation
For this period, there is io comprehensive  empirical  work on manufacturing  protection  and
only some limited nominal protection estimates for agriculture.  But it is unlikely that the basic
structure of relative incentives  for agriculture  will have changed  very much.
The overall  anti-agriculture  bias is certainly  still in place  for the following  reasons:
-Measured  manufacturing  protection  will have come down owing to (i) the removal of QRs
on most manufactured  intermediate  goods and most capital  goods (ii) the reduction  in the maxium
tariff to  110 % in  1992 and to  85 % in  1993 (iii) the large number of effectively non traded
manufactured  products resulting  from continuing  import  bans (e.g., cn all consumer  goods) or from
redundant  tariffs. The domestic  prices of the latter are delinked  from world prices and most of them
have probably  not risen by the full amount  of the devaluation. But in agriculture  the domestic  prices
of wheat, rice and coarse grains have also risen by much less than the devaluation, so that the
average price level of agriculture  has also fallen relative to world prices.  Other agriculture  prices
(e.g. oilseeds,  pulses, cotton)  have moved  up more or less in line with the devaluation,  but the main
graim dominate  agricultural  GDP.
The big dispersions of incentives within agriculture are basically unchanged and may
have Increased in some respects.
Following  the devaluation  up to about  February 1992, border prices of wheat  and rice were
about double domestic prices.  For the first time in many years market prices of wheat in Punjab
were consistently  well below (about 40 percent) estimated  export  parity prices, i.e., estimated fob
prices minus transport costs  to Bombay  from Punjab minus  Bombay  port costs. The domestic  prices
of common  rice were even lower than this in relation to export parity prices. Punjab prices remain
7well below export  parity prices despite substantial  increases  in the government's procurement  prices
for the 1992/93  season. This situation  can only be maintained  by the continuing  export controls. On
the other hand domestic  edible oil prices rose substantially  and remained at moie or less the 1980s
level (two or three times as high) in relation to import prices. If maintained, this disparity will
increase the substitution  of oilseeds  for wheat and other grains and maintain about the same pull of
resources from pulses and other crops whose prices have risen more or  less in  line with the
devaluation.
Relative to border prices, the cost of traded inputs for agriculture has probably declined
slightly.
Fertiliser prices have increased , but overall by not as much as the devaluation (see later
discussion). The costs of farm machinery,  pesticides  and minor tradeable inputs have also probably
gone up less than the devaluation.
The non tradeable Input subsidies to agriculture will have declined In real teems but are
still substantial and highly distortionary.
As long as the devaluation  remains a real one, i.e., is not erased by increases in the prices
of non tradeables,  the subsidies  on the non tradeables  will represent  less in terms of the world  prices
of the agricultural  commodities. However, this effect may be offset to some extent by increases in
the default rate on agricultural loans resulting  from a politically  motivated  govermment  program in
1990 which waived repayments  of agricultural  loans.  The overall level of input subsidies is also
probably  higher in budgetary  terms.
IL  Policy Reform: Objectives for the Medium or Long Term and  Tactics for the Short
TOm
This section  suggests  objectives  for the medium  or longer  run, and some ideas  on what might
be feasible start in the present environment.  The next section makes some general suggestions  on
the tactics of reform.
II.1  Removing  anti-agriculture  bias and creating  more neutral incentives  within agriculture
0) Removing anti- agricultural bias
The  main  instrument for  this  should be  the  continued reduction of  protection to
manufacturing. The government  has stated that it intends to continue removing  QRs applied to
manufactured  goods i.e to manufactured  consumer  goods, since most intermediate  and capital  goods
are already freed from import licensing.  In 1992 it made a small beginning by allowing certain
exporters  to use part of their foreign exchange  earnings  to import a number of specified consumer
goods, and in 1993  the "baggage  allowance  " for Indians reurning from abroad  was relaxed. It has
also announced  that tariffs (present  maximum  85 percent) will be reduced  to about  20 or 30 percent
in two to three years.  (Ihis was originally  stated  as the target for the maximum  tariff, but since then
8there appears  to have  been  some  backslding  in that the latest  _  refer to this as the target
for average  tariffs).  The reduction  of manufctrig  protection  should  be accompanied  by whatever
devaluations  of the real  exchange  rate  are needed  to keep  the trade  deficit  under  control. It would
be a major milstake  - and In any case Impractcal  to attempt to offset  the high protection  of
manufacturing  with high protection  for agricultur  Agricultural  tariffs  should  be zero or at least
kept  down  to a maximum  of say, 10%.
But for the above  process  to improve  relative  incentives  for agriculture,  it will be essentlal
to allow  the devalued  exchange  rate  to feed  through  to the prices  of agricultural  commodities.  The
best way for this to occur naturally  and smoothly  is to remove the quantitative  controls  on
agricultural  imports  and  exports  and  marketing  board  and  other  ineventions which  affect  domestic
prices,  so that  domestic  prices  are linked  directly  to world  prices. The removal  of agricultural  QRs
and  of prohibitive  import  tariffs  wIll  involve:
- Abolishing  the present export controls, including  canalisation  (i.e parastatal export
monopolies),  export  licensing  and quotas,  minimum  export  prices  etc. This could  be done more  or
less immediately  without  much difficulty. A clean  sweep  should  be made of all these export
restrictions,  with  the onus  on those  who  want  to phase  some  of them  out more  gradually  to make
a convincing  case.  A case  for some  form  of more  permanent  special  treatment  (export  taxes  ?) could
perhaps  be made for common  rice, sugar, tea and jute.  There may also be a case for partial
insuation of  the domestic  prices of wheat, rice and sugar from the larger fluctuations  in
international  prices,  at least  as a transitional  measure.  These  last two  points  are discussed  below.
- Abolishing  import  canalisation  (i.e., parastatal  import  monopolies)  and other  quantitative
import  controls  and  setting  zero  or low  import  duties. These  reforms  will have  to he accompanied
by far reaching  reforms  of the activities  of the parastatal  organisations  and marketing  boards  (e.g.
FCI, the State  Trading  Corporation,  the Cotton  Corporation,  the  Rubber  Board  etc)  and  of domestic
reguatory  policies,  and are likely  to be difficult  and  politically  highly  sensitive. A major  task in
designing  a feasible  reform  strategy  will  be deciding  how,  in what  order, and  over  what  time  period
this should  be done.
In liberalising  import  and  export  controls  and  reducing  tariffs,  the  considerable  potential  for
trade  with  India's  neighbours  should  not  be forgotten.  Recently  India  has susrted  importing  short  and
medium  staple  cotton  from Pakistan. Provided  political  problems  can  be overcome,  there  is a very
considerable  potential  for greatly  expanded  trade in agricultural  products  with all the neighbours,
especially  Pakistan,  Bangladesh  and Sri Lanka.
(O)  Creating  more neutral incentives  within agricultre
This involves:
-Removing  export  controls  which  depress  domestic  prices  below  export  prices. Particularly
important:  the controls  on the export  of cotton,  wheat  and common  rice.
-Removing  import  controls  and  setting  zero  or low  tariffs  on highly  protected  commodities.
Particularly  important:  edible  oils and  oilseeds,  sugar  and  rubber.
-Removing  regulatory  and other domestic  controls  which would otherwise  impede the
transmission  of world  price  signals  to firmers.
9These reforms should apply to the commodities  in their pr  zessed and unprocessed  forms.
nernational trade is often  maiy  in the processed  commoditiei,  e.g., edible  oils and oilmeals  versus
oilseeds; sugar and molasses versus sugarcane.  When both the primary commodity and the
processed versions are Internationally  traded, liberalising  one wil  require liberalising the others.
For example, the removal of export controls from cotton wiUl  need to be  accompanied  by the
removal  of export  quotas  from cotton  yarn (except  the country-specific  quotas  required  by the MFA).
(l)  Short term tactics
Both the above objectives L.e, removing anti-agriculture  bias and creating more neutral
incentives  within agriculture, can be achieved  by remsving impediments  to Lnports  and exports and
thus linking domestic prices to world prices.  But in view of the long past history of controls on
international  trade and the need to take account of the likely reactions  of politically  powerful  groups
and to avoid exposing  low income  groups to sudden adverse  price changes, in some cases this may
have to be done gradually in order to ensure a smooth  transition.
As regrds  exports, the prevailing  philosophy  has been to treat the export markets  of most
agricultural  commodities  as 'residual' markets, i.e.,  exports are  only allowed if the country  has
a surplus after meeting domestic needs, even if domestic  prices are much lower than export prices
and the exports would be both privately and economically  profitable.  A classic example of this
philosophy  in action is cotton,  which has been  subjected  to export  quotas and minimum  export  prices
that are haltingly announced  against a background  of intense lobbying and bargaining between the
textdle  industry, the handloom industry, and the cotton growers and traders.  This results in the
sporadic  appearance  of Indian cotton in expor markets, basicaUy  in years when there is an overall
surplus in the domestic market.  The uncerinty  which this has created for both Indian exporters
and foreign importers has discouraged  them from investing in long term marketing facilities and
relationships  and has contributed  to Indian cotton varieties being exported at substantial  discounts
from equivalent  varieties  exported  from other countries.  Furthermore,  by periodically  depressing  the
domestic prices of the various varieties  below world prices in arbitrary ways, it has contributed  to
an unpredictable  and inefficient  structure of effective  protection  for cotton yarn production  and has
led to the wasteful  use of high quality  long staple cottons  in the production  of low and medium  count
yarns for sale in the domestic market. The philosophy  ilustrated by the treatment of cotton  exports
clearly has to change if Indian agriculture  is to be integrated into global markets.  Policies should
cease disciminating against exportables  such as coucn so that India can emerge as a regular and
reliable exporter of those commodities  in which it has a comparative  advantage.
For most agricultural  products  it should  be possible to immediately  remove all the remaining
export controls, including  minimum export prices.u  A mumber  of these are in any case basically
importable  with domestic prices exceeding  world prices (e.g. oilseeds and edible oils) so that the
abolidon of export controls would have little overall impact on these industries  or on consumers.
Nevertheless it  is possible that the controls may prevent exports in some circumstances e.g.
temporary surpluses  in areas where transport  costs and delivery  times would make it more profitable
to supply neighbouring countries rather than more distant parts of India.  In the case of pulses,
export controls are prevening exports of particar  varieties of processed and unprocessed  pulses
for which there is a substal  foreign demand (particularly among Indian communities  in the
Middle  East and elsewhere)  even though  the substantal unrestricted  Indian  imports  of different types
of pulses from Turkey, Australia  and other countries can assure adequate  supplies to the domestic
market.
However for the reasons given above, it may be better to move more slowly with some
especially "sensidvew  commodities. We have in mind in particular rice, wheat, cotton, and sugar,
10and there may be  others.  For rice,  wheat and cotton we would suggest a  'selective variety
approach" in which, as a transitional  measure, only the export  of particular higher valued varieties
which are not generally consumed  by lower income consumers would be allowed initially.  In the
case of rice, this has already been implemented  for some time by allowing exports of basmati rice,
and in early 1993 quota restrictions  were removed  from exports of superfine long grain rice.  This
could be extended to fine varieties.  In the case of wheat, the same principal could be applied by
initially  allowing  exports of the durum varieties. In the case  of cotton, export controls initially  could
be removed  from longer staple cottons, say beyond a staple length of 30mm. In order to moderate
the upward pull that would be exerted on the prices of the lower quality  varieties of these  products,
or at least to provide a ceiling, imports  of lower quality varieties could be allowed. In the case of
sugar, controls could initially be removed from exports of sugar in raw form (brown sugar), for
which there is so far little domestic demand, and whose production should be encouraged.  We
recognise  the administrative  problems  that this 'selective variety approach' may pose, and therefore
suggest it  only  as  a  short term  transition  towards fully opening up  the  exports of  these
commodities.
In addition to removing explicit export controls, other regulations and controls should be
investigated and if necessary changed if  it turns out that they are impeding exports. There is
probably considerable  potential, in particular, for greatly expanded exports of unprocessed and
processed fruit and vegetables,  cut flowers, and fresh and processed seafood. The traditional  export
industries  subject  to commodity  board interventions-  tobacco, tea, coffee, spices (particularly  chillies
and black pepper)-  should also be looked  at from this perspective. As an example,  the Coffee  Board
keeps domestic prices below export prices by a mechanism  involving compulsory  purchase of all
coffee production and the allocation of the acquired coffee to separate auctions for domestic and
export sales. In 1993 the system was liberalised  to some extent by allowing up to 30 percent of
plantation  production  to be sold directly  in the internal  market. It is difficult  to see the rationale for
these interventions,  since  India, with a world market share of about  2 to 3 percent, has no significant
power to influence  world  prices, and the international  coffee  agreement  which set export quotas, has
been inoperative since 1989.  Furthermore, coffee is hardly an imrportant  item of consumption  by
low income Indian consumers. 12 If quantitative  export controls  are ever needed again in the future
as a result of new international  agreements,  the most straightforward  way to implement  them would
be to auction export licences corresponding  to the agreed quantity of exports.
In some cases controls on the export of the commodity  in its primary or raw form are
imposed  in order to indirectly subsidise  its export in processed/packaged  form.  In order to avoid
an excessively abrupt removal of such subsidies, in some cases the export controls could be
temporarily  replaced by an export tax.  But the aim should be to remove these export taxes over a
reasonably short period, so that the form in which the products are exported are not artificially
distorted.'3
In other cases the export controls may have been introduced  in the hope that the net return
to the industry could be increased by restricting Indian supply and raising export prices.  The
potential for this kind of benefit is often vastly overestimated,  in particular by failure to predict the
speed and extent of the development  of alternative  sources  of supply  in the world market, and similar
underestimates  of the extent of substitution  away from the product  by consumers. Allowance  is also
seldom made for the fact that the overvaluation  of the exchange  rate inherent in the general system
of import controls and tariffs is already restricting export supply even when there are no explicit
export restrictions or taxes.  Finally, even if there are benefits from export restriction over and
above the restriction  due to the overvalued  exchange  rate, account  has to be taken of the  economic
costs  of the administration  of the restrictions  and the rent seeking  which is likely  to accompany  them,
especially  if they consist of export  licensing  or some other discretionary  controls, rather than export
11taxes.  For these r-asons, we believe that it will seldom  be possible to make a convincing  case for
the terms-of-trade  argument for export taxes or restrictions: a few possible exceptions (rice, tea,
sugar and jute) for which some kind of special  treatment such as export  taxes might be justified, are
discussed below.
On the imports front,  the extent of the Rupee devaluation  over the past three years has
meant that at present, if they were imported, the landed costs of most major commodities  would
considerably  exceed domestic prices. This provides an excellent opportunity for decanalising  and
otherwise  removing non-tariff  controls  from imports  of products such as wheat, rice, coarse cereals
and cotton, without  disturbing  domestic  markets  to any significant  extent. The present extent of the
devaluation would also facilitate the removal of quantitative  controls from imports of rubber and
sugar, which on average have been highly  protected in the past.  The general principle would be to
replace the physical controls with tariffs.  In most cases these should be zero from the beginning,
but in others they could start at higher levels  and could  be reduced  over time, preferably according
to a pre-announced  timetable. If need be, particularly if there are signs of deliberate dumping  by
some supplier for the very short run (as may happen in the case of sugar), temporary anti-dumping
duties could be introduced  to safeguard  the interests  of the domestic producers.  Care needs to be
taken, however, that anti-dumping  measures do not simply become a means for reintroducing
arbitrary, ad hoc  and lobby- prone protection  by the back door" 4. As a transitional measure, to
alleviate  concerns  about excessive  fluctuations  in world prices, consideration  could also be given to
variable tariff schemes which link domestic prices to  a moving average of world prices (see
discussion  below).
In freeing up imports, there is need for special caution in dealing with edible oils.  Most of
these  have protection  levels equivalent  to two or three times world prices, and even more in the case
of copra and coconut oil.1'  Suddenly  opening up  edible oil imports over low tariffs would
seriously damage the large investments  that have gone into this sector over the past three or four
years as a consequence  of the 'success' of the Tecrhnology  Mission on Oilseeds."  Nevertheless,
the message  should be conveyed  in no uncertain  terms to the edible oil industry  as also to the oilseed
producers that given the level of technology  and of prices in world markets, it is not advantageous
for India to increase its production  through price hikes culminating  in area shifts. Edible oil imports
should be decanalised  and subject  to whatever is the current maximum  import duty rate (presently
85  percent) in the first year, to be reduced to say 60, 40 , 20 and 10 or zero percent in subsequent
years. As a transitional  measure, it has also been suggested  that India could arrange a short term
bilateral contract (for say three years) with a country  like Malaysia  for the import of palm oil against
exports of rice. The main argument  for this is that it could help sell the initial  stages of the required
reduction in oilseed protection, by providing  an easily visible counterbalancing  benefit.  But there
are many dangers in this type of strategy, and we believe  the potential costs outweigh  the benefits.
If  a process of non -discriminatory import liberalisation is at all feasible, it would be  much
preferable even if the rate of tariff reduction is relatively slow.' 7
Xj3  Special treatment of commodities  in which the potential Indian supplv or demand may
aDnreciably  affect world orices in the long run.
While sudden changes  in Indian imports (e.g., in STC's imports of edible oils) or exports
may cause  temporary blips in world  prices in the short run, the only major agricultural  commodities
in which India probably  has some significant  long run market power are rice, sugar, tea and jute.
Some kind of special treatment (e.g., export taxes or import duties)  may be justified in these cases,
bearing in mind that -as noted above-  exports are already  taxed by the overvaluation  of the exchange
12rate resulting  from import  protection,  mainly  to  nu  . Although India and Bangladesh
dominate  world production  of Jute, their individual  and combined market power is probably limited
owing to substitute synthetics.  The main efficiency  gains would be from opening up trade in both
raw jute and jute products across the border with Bangladesh.
High quality basmati rice is exported, but some limited exports of common (non basmati)
rice  began to be allowed for the first time only in 1991. In 1993 larger exports of superfine rice
were permitted  subject  to a minimum  export  price. Ihese liberalisation  measures  should  be continued
and expanded. Doing so will not fully raise domestic prices to the present level of world prices,
since world  prices will  be depressed  by Indian  exports on any substantial  scale. Furthermore,  export
markets  demand  high quality  rice with low broken percentages  which substitutes  imperfectly  for the
predominant  poorer quality rice (mainly  about  20% broken)  sold in domestic  markets. The optimum
export tax and the optimum level of exports wil  depend on this price depressing effect (i.e., the
elasticity of excess demand),  the extent of the exchange  rate overvaluation,  and the level of the non
traded subsidies  (irrigation, electricity  and credit) to rice growing. Substantial  export earnings  (say
$1 billion for 3 miUlion  tons?) should be easily achievable  in a short time with a moderate  increase
in domestic prices (say 10% to 20% ?).
Apart from these major commodities,  Indian exports constitute a fairly large share of the
world market In the case of cardoman, black pepper and processed cashew nuts.  For all these, the
supply  from other countries  is likely to be quite  elastic. Unless a convincing  case can be made, we
would not recommend  any measures  such as export taxes that would restrict supply more than the
restriction already brought about  by the overvaluation  of the exchange  rate.
f,  Dealing with unstable world prices and fluctuations  in domestic production
Until now, the insulation of the domestic markets from world market conditions and the
government's buffer stocidng  policies  in the case of foodgrains, have meant that the domestic  prices
of most agricultural commodities  have been considerably  more stable  than international  prices. An
exceptions is cotton, for which during the 1980s  domestic prices have actually been less stable in
important respects than world prices, in large measure because of the erratic application  of export
controls. Other exceptions  are pulses and wool, whose  domestic  prices have moved  broadly in line
with  import  prices after the freeing of imports in the early 1980s. Freeing imports and exports of
wheat and rice and the other commodities  from canalisation,  licensing and other controls  will mean
that domestic prices will move up and down with international  prices.  At the same time, the
monsoons  and other conditions  wiUl  contnue to cause fluctuations  in domestic  production. Is this a
problem, and If so, how should it be dealt with?
In the long run, there are strong arguments  for allowing  domestic  prices to be directly linked
to international  prices. Most importantly,  this means that production  and consumption  decisions  wiUl
constandy  take account of Ildia's comparative  advantage  without  the lags and other disturbances  in
the price signals which result from trade-intervening  measures.  Provided households  below the
poverty line can be protected  from fluctuing  prices  by an efficient  targeted  system  of food subsidies
(see later discussion) the remaining  consumers (say 70% of households)  should be able to adjust
without difficulty  to the somewhat  greater movements  in food prices knat  would occur.  Secondly,
as regards fluctuations  in domestic  production, India's present self-sufficiency  in grain despite the
strong anti-agriculural bias of the  bintve  system suggests that a  more neutral structure of
incentives could lead India to become a permanent, relatively large grain exporter.  Despite
continuing  growth of the very large population, land scarcity and environmental  problems, this also
13seems plausible because of the very large productivity  differences  between grain production in the
north-west and elsewhere.  In such a scenDrio,  in which there would  be substantial  exports of wheat
but in which rice exports would be taxed in order to take account of the narrownes of the world
rice market, domestic prices will be determined  by export prices (minus the export tax in the case
of rice) and  all or most of the impact of poor monsoons would automatically  be absorbed by
declining exports.  If imports are needed, the ceiling for domestic prices would be cif prices plus
transport and other costs to the point at which imported and domestic grains compete.  As an
indication  of the scope that this would allow  for weather  related  price flucations  in wheat and rice,
between 1985  and 1987  the estimated  cif-fob  margin  (as a percentage  of the cif price) averaged  about
5% in the case of rice and 17% in the case  of wheat. Domestic  port, transport and markeedng  costs
videned  these margins considerably,  however. For example,  for rice, the average  estimated  pre-fob
price at Calcutta (i.e. the price before loading onto ships) was about 20% lower than the estimated
landed cost of imported  rice. The price difference  in the Punjab (the  main surplus area for rice) was
about  25%.  The corresponding  differences  for wheat  were 36% a- the port (assumed  to be Bombay)
and  43% in Punjab.  1'
Although  allowing  domestic  wheat  and rice prices  to fluctuate  with world  prices as described
above should be the long term objective, we recognise that it may not be desirable or politically
feasible to move to such a system in the short run, especially in view of the deficiencies of the
present safety  net for poor households  and the time probably  required to reform it.  In that event the
governmeat  could consider  a system of variable  import and export taxes and subsidies  which would
be based on a moving  average of past inerational  prices.  If properly implemented  such a system
can smooth out the effects  of short and medium  term fluctuations  in world prices on domestic  prices
while ensuring that they move with world prices in the longer run.  At the same time no
discretionary, quantitative  controls on trade are required and imports and exports can be made by
private traders without restriction, subject only to the payment of the current variable export or
import tax, or receipt  of the current variable import or export  subsidy. Ihere would  be no need for
a government  buffer stock: inventories  would be held by private agents, including  private firms in
other countries with an interest in supplying  or buying from India. Based on their assessment  of the
probability of a bad monsoon, it would also pay private traders to hold inventories over from one
harvest season to the next, to take advantage  of any potential movement  of domestic  prices upward
from the fob levels towards or to cif levels.  If the monsoon in fact turns out to be poor, like a
government  buffer stock this wiUl  reduce the required volume of imports.
There is a lot of experience with moving-average  price band schemes in other countries
which should be  studied carefully.' 9 From our  reading of  this experience, our  preliminary
suggestions  for India are that:
-The government  should  be wiling to commit  itself to pay out import subsidies  when  current
international  prices go above the calculated  moving  average target price.  Failure to do this and the
consequent  failure to protect consumers  against  high international  prices has been a major deficiency
of other schemes.  A symmetric scheme which both taxes and subsidises imports and exports is
similar to  a stabilisation fimd which could hedge its risk  in intnonal  commodity ftres
markets.3
- The period covered  by the moving average should not be too long. Say weekly avere
prices for the previous four or so years?
14-The prices used in the moving average formula should preferably be taken from some
international  souwce  (e.g., Chicago Board of Trade prices for wheat), not from records of Indian
import or export prices which the firms affected by the application of the formula can influence.
The moving  average price would then be adjusted  in a transparent way for transport and other costs
to give the desired price band; for example  the difference  between L-e calculated  moving average
cif import price and the calculated  moving average fob export price.
The formula is used to calculate  the percentage  difference between the moving average
price and the transport-cost  adjusted  current price, also calculated  from the price at the international
market center.  If the current price exceeds  the upper level of the band, this is announced  as the a
valorem export tax rate for exports from India for the coming  period (say a week?) and as the ad
valorem import subsidy  rate for the same period. If the adjusted  current price lies within  the band,
there are no export taxes or subsidies. If the adjusted current price is less than the lower level of
the band, the percentage difference becomes the ad valorem  export subsidy and import duty
respectively.
-The formula  and the data on which it based are made public so that participants  in the trade
can accurately predict the duty or subsidy  rate which will be applied to their imports or exports in
the near term and hedge their risks in futures markets when planning further ahead.  For obvious
reasons, it will also be vital to stick to a formula once it is agreed and to resist pressures to make
ad hoc changes.
-Moving average schemes in  other countries have usually been applied to  imported
commodities  only and have included a band around the moving average (say plus or minus 10
percent) within  which import  prices are allowed  to vary before attracting  the special import tax. (As
noted above, probably reflecting the greater bargaining power of farm lobbies compared to the
lobbying  power of consumers, import subsidies  have not been paid in practice). In India, there is
a concern that the potential fluctuation of domestic prices between fob and cif limits is already
excessive (owing  to unpredictable  monsoons  and both rice and wheat  shifting  from being  exportables
to being importable from year to year).  For this reason, such a scheme could start without any
additional  scope for price variation other than the fob/cif gap.  Margins for further variation could
be introduced  if the commodities  become firmly established  as exportables  or as importable  despite
substantial variations in weather conditions.  Alternatively, if the potential for domestic price
fluctuations  resulting from the fob/cif  gap is considered  to be excessive  (as for wheat?)  the allowable
price band could be narrowed.
Given the objective of  reducing the exposure of Inaian producers and  consumers to
fluctuations  in world prices, moving- average price band schemes  have important advantages  over
government buffer stock schemes which involve the maintenance  of quantitative controls over
imports  and exports, and most likely  the maintenance  of controls  over private traders  to prevent them
from  accumulating or  running down stocks and offsetting the  activities of the  buffer stock
organisation. But like buffer stock arrangements,  the schemes  also introduce  distortions  of various
kinds, both directly into the markets  of the products to which the schemes  apply and indirectly  into
markets  of substitutes. For example,  an export  tax on wheat required by the scheme's formula may
prevent or limit wheat exports even though  domestic production costs may be lower than world
prices  Again, if wheat exports are taxed under the scheme but coarse grains are not covered by it,
coarse grain might be exported even though the economic  return from exporting wheat would be
higher.  There are also potential complications  with downstream  products.  For example, if wheat
15imports are taxed but no such special import tax is applied to flour or flour products, domestic
producers of the latter are likely to be squeezed. Effects of these kinds are also likely to lead to
pressures which have the potential to greatly complicate  and undermine the transparency of the
schemes  and to generate a lot of lobbying. For these reasons there is much to be said for treating
the schemes  as transitional  devices  and phasing them out over some defined period.  This could be
done, for example, by pre-announced  increases in the price bands to the point where intervention
would only occur in the event of extreme  peaks or troughs in world commodity  prices of the order
of magnitude  of those experienced  ac  the time of the first oil- price shock.
I[5  Removing imnort controls. high tariffs and domestic regulatory controls from tradeable
inputs used in agriculture
The most important things to  do here concern fertilisers.  Except for some recently
deregulated  phosphatic and potassic fertilisers, the industry is controlled  by a combination  of an
import  monopoly  by MMTC,  a fixed  single  nationwide  wholesale  price for each fertiliser,  a cost-plus
pricing system for each individual fertiliser plant, and large subsidies provided by the central
government. The pervasive  distortions  on both the production  and distribution  sides of the fertiliser
industry are well known and well documented. Our analysis  of the subsidies,  based on comparisons
of domestic and international  prices during the 1980s, revealed that roughly half of the budgeted
subsidy supported high  cost  fertiliser  producers (Gulati,  1990;  Gulati and  Kalra,  1992).
Consequently  the entire burden of the removal of fertiliser subsidies  would not fall on farmers:  a
significant  part would require the rationalisation  of fertiliser production.
The key element in price control is the Retention Price Scheme (RPS), under which a
normative cost- plus pricing formula is applied to  each individual plant. Reflecting differing
feedstock  prices, technologies,  locations and operating efficiencies, there are large differences in
retention  prices as between  fertiliser plants. The situation is further distorted by the fact that there
is no systematic  link between the controlled  prices of the various feedstocks (naphtha, fuel oil,
natural gas and coal) and their international  prices.  Given these distortions and the absence of
import competition,  the location  of fertiliser  plants is also suboptimal. On top of all this, the Joint
Parliamentary  Committee  on Fertiliser Pricing (GOI, 1992) noted  that the cost figures supplied  by
various fertiliser factories were seldom cross checked by the Fertiliser Industry Coordination
Committee (FICC), which administers  the RPS.  This indicates  the existence  of considerable  scope
for exaggerating  the normative  cost both directly and by understating  capacity.
In July 1991  a start was made  on moving  away from the pervasive  regulation  of the industry,
by increasing controlled wholesale selling prices by 40 percent, decontrolling the prices of low
analysis nitrogenous fertilisers, and setting a ceiling on the subsidy for Single Super Phosphate
(SSP).  This was a sensible attempt  to begin ieversing  a trend of increasing  subsidies  under which
nominal farmer prices had been virtually  unchanged  for ten years and the total budgetary subsidy
had grown  to more than half of central  government  spending  on agriculture  and to about  one percent
of GDP.  5ubsequent  policy changes have been halting and contradictory, however, and in some
important  ways have worsened  resource allocation.  They are recounted  below in order to  illustrate
the importance of obtaining agreement on clear objectives for policy reform, especially when
politically  powerfil groups are significantly  affected. In summary:
August 1991 . Previous increase in controlled  fertiliser prices of 40 percent rolled back to
30 percent , and small and marginal  farmers exempted  from the increase altogether.
March 1992. Rock phosphate  and sulphur imports (inpats for phosphate fertiliser plants)
decanalised (i.e.the import monopoly  of MMTC was removed and private imports allowed).
16Auggst  142.  Controlled  prices  of urea (accoundng  for about  half of all fertlliser  sales)
reduced  by a further  10  percent.
Price  controls  reintroduced  on  low  analysis  nitrogenous  frtlisers.
Prices  of phosphatic  and  potassic  fertlisers  decontrolled.
September  199-. Farmer  subsidy  of Rs 1000/ton  introduced  for di-ammonium  phosphate
(DAP) and  MOP (muriate  of potash): equivalent  to price  reduction  of about  13 percent.
DAP imports decanalised  i.e.  MMT  C import monopoly  removed  and private imports
allowed.
Controlled  naphtha  and  fuel oil feedstock  prices  to fertliser  plants  increased.
Jue 122a. DAP subsidy  of Rs 1000/ton  contiued for domestically  produced  DAP but
discontinued  for imported  DAP.
New  subsidy  depending  on phosphate  content  introduced  for domestically  produced  complex
phosphatic  fertilisers  but not for imports  of the same  ferdlisers.
The effect  of these  changes  was  to keep  the controlled  farmer  prices  of nitrogenous  fertilisers  (of
which  by far the most important  is urea)  well  below  border  prices  while contimiing  to pay large
subsidies  on imported  fertilisers  and to the nitrogenous  fertliser manufacturers  equivalent  to the
difference  between  these  prices  and  their  production  costs. By contrast,  when  the  prices  but  not  the
imports  of phosphatic  and potassic  fertlisers were initially  decontrolled,  their prices suddenly
doubled  or more than doubled,  and in the case  of DAP they went from about 20 percent  below
international  prices to about  50 percent  above. Ihe freeing  of DAP inmports  then brought  DAP
prices  down  to about  the  cif level  plus  port and  domestic  transport  and  marketing  costs,  but  this  was
reported  to have  caused  the closure  of 8 out of 11  DAP  m  a  plants. Attempts  were  made
to respond  to the resulting  political  pressures,  first  by a general  fixed  subsidy  paid  on both  imperted
and domestic  fertilsers which  aimed  to reduce  the prices paid by famers, but subsequently  by
limiting  the subsidies  to domestic  fertlisers  with  the aim  of protecting  the local  manufcturers  and
enabling  them  to reopen.
Apart from generating  a great deal  of uncertnty  for all market  participants,  especially
farmers,  the  net effect  of these  changes  was  to send  a signal  to farmers  to increase  urea  consumption
but to cut down  on the consumption  of DAP  and MOP. Already  the relative  consumption  ratios
were not favourab!e  from  an agronomic  point  of view,  and these  price signals  made the situation
even worse. As expected,  during  the rabi season  of the 1992-93  crop, while  the sales of DAP
dropped  by about  30 per cent, and of MOP  by about  50 per cent (compared  to the previous  rabi
crop), urea sales went up by more than 20 per cent and in some areas it was being sold at a
premium.
Halting  and contradictory  atempts  of this  kind to liberaise the production  and distribution
of fertilisers  should  be avoided. As an example  of a possible  approach,  in the 1993-94  season,  the
controlled  farmer  price of urea could  be raised  by about 15 to 20 per cent, while  the subsidy  on
DAP  and  MOP could  be reduced  to, say,  Rs 600  per tonne. Ihe subsidy  on nitrogenous  fertlisers
(urea)  could  be limited  to a maximum  of Ra 1000  per tonne. Taking  account  of projected  future
world  urea  prices, the government  could  then  announce  a  package  which  would  include  increases
of future  urea  prices  for farmers,  limits  on the per ton subsidy  to industry,  and  the liberalisation  of
ferdliser  imports. Changes  such as these  would  help  with dismantling  the retention  price  scheme
in due course  and with  the other far  reaching  reforms  which  are needed.
In summary,  the longer  term  reform  objectives  in the fertliser sector  should  be to:
-Decanalise  ferdliser  imports,  i.e., remove  the MMTC  import  monopoly  and  allow  private
imports;
17-Set low to moderate  tariffs (say 10 % or 15% ?);
-Abolish  the retention  price scheme for fertUiser  plants;
-Abolish  the fixed subsidised  domestic  fertiliser  price to farmers  and the uniform naiionwide
pricing which goes with it;
-Abolish  the fertiliser subsidy  as regards both farmers and producers;
-Adjust feedstock  prices for fertiiser plants to reflect their opportunity  costs.
India probably has little long run market power in nitrogeneous  ferilisers, but conceivably
could have some in phosphatic  fertilisers. Special  treatment  of some kind (an above average import
tax?) might be justified for the latter.
Imports of seeds, pesticides, farm machinery, plastic piping and other farm Inputs are
subject to import licensing &/c; high tariffs (for example, tractor imports are effectively blocked
by a tariff of 80 %).  A beginning  on freeing up these controls was made in April 1993  by allowing
agro-industries  which ernort 50 percent or more of their output ("Export Oriented  Units") to import
their inputs duty free, and to import capital equipment at concessional import duty rates.  This
initiative should be extended  and all agricultural and agro-industrial inputs and to agricultural
machinery, which should be freed from non-tariff  controls and subject to low to moderate import
tariffs. The prices of the domestic producers of these  products in many cases are well below duty -
inclusive import  prices, so the overall cost of these inputs to farmers  would probably  not be reduced
by much. Nevertheless,  such a reform will make  all kinds  of technologies  available  which at present
are not found in India, and will shake up the domestic  manufacturers.2'
In 1991, tractors , combine harvesters and rice transplanters were included in the list of
products for which there is now automatic  approval  of foreign  technology  agreements  and of foreign
equity of up to 51% .However most agricultural implements  and other farm inputs such as plastic
piping and sheeting are reserved for production  by small scale firms'.  By preventing small firms
from growing and larger firms from competing, small scale industry (SSI) reservation adversely
affects  the quality, technological  level and marketing  of these  inputs. SSI reservation  creates  similar
problems for the efficiency  of agricultural  processing industries  such as rice milling, cotton ginning
and oilseed crushing.  It also prevents direct investment  by foreign firms in the production of the
reserved products.  While SSI reservation is a general problem affecting  the whole manufacturing
sector in India, it has a particularly  marked negative  impact on the efficiency  of farming and of the
agro processing industries.  For this reason , special attention  should  be  paid to  removing
agricultural and agro-processing inputs from the small scale industry reservation lists.  At the
same time, other  regulatory  impediments (e.g. excessive red  tape  and  delays in  obtaining
enviromnental clearances,  registering land etc) to competition and  to direct  investment by
foreign firms in the agricultural input industries,  should also be removed.
The overall combined impact of these changes will be to increase the average cost of
tradeable  inputs to farmers, because  the freeing up of fertiliser  prices and the phasing  out of fertiliser
subsidies  will dominate  reductions  in the prices of the other inputs. On the other hand better quality
inputs embodying later technologies  and more varieties of inputs will become available, and also
better and more efficient distribution, provided inventory  and other controls on private traders are
18eliminated. As with the removal of irrigation, electricity  and credit subsidies,  to help defuse farmer
opposition, the fertiliser reforms should be accompanied  by the actions discussed previously to
remove the discrimination  against agriculture  on the output side.
IL6  Removing large subsidies  on non traded inputs: canal irrigation, electricity  and credit
The serious distortions  resulting from subsidised  charges  for these services  are well known.
Reform involves  major and far reaching changes  in the organisation  and operations  of the irrigation
commands,  state electricity  boards, and the banking  system. As with fertilisers, instituting  prices for
these services which reflect opportunity  costs will be more acceptable  if it is seen by farmers to be
accompanied  by measures  which increase  relative agricultural  incentives  on the output side, as also
increased  efficiency  in the delivery  of these inputs. But it will still be politically  difficult  in regions
or for crops (e.g., rice in some parts of the north wvst)  in which the size of the input price increases
may outweigh any feasible or desirable increases in output prices.  Likewise, it will be politically
difficult for those portions of highly protected crops which are irrigated (notably oilseeds and
sugarca'ie in most years) which should face declining  outpu: prices despite the general increase in
the price level of all or most other crops. Substitution  into the more profitable  crops (to the extent
that it is possible) will frequently not offset the loss of the large economic rents inherent in the
present system of input subsidies.
As regards the subsidy on canal waters, the situation is extremely serious.  But since
irrigation is a state subject, and the form of subsidy  is somewhat  different, it does not create much
'noise' in the central budget or in the corridors of the Ministry of Finance, as does the fertiliser
subsidy. The nation has spent more than Rs 600 billion ($US 36 billion) at 1988-89  prices on canal
networks during the last forty years, adding an irrigation  potential  of more than 22 mitlion hectares
(Gulati, 1993). Today, the direct recovery from farmers towards the cost of canal waters is only a
small fraction of operational  and maintenance  expenses, not to speak of capital costs. The low cost
recovery (in most states the rates have not been revised during the last 10 years or so) is starving
state exchequers  and irrigation  departments.  As a result, minimum  essential  repairs remain  neglected
and in many cases the continued existence of the systems is at stake.  In  1972 the Irrigation
Commission  recommended  that the price of canal waters should account for about 5 per cent of the
gross revenue of farmers in the case of foodgrains  while  for cash crops it should  be near 12 per cent.
The present reality, however, is that water charges  probably  average only around one percent of the
gross revenue of irrigated farms.'
Recently, an Expert  Committee on Pricing of Irrigation Waters (GOI, 1992)24  examined
the financial position  of the irrigation  sector in gri-at detail, and recommended  an increase of more
than six times in water charges collections  (from existing levels of Rs 50 per hectare to Rs 310 per
hectare) through a two part tariff structure. According  to the Committee's calculations,this  would
amount to about 6 per cent of the gross revenue of an average farm .It would, however,  ;over
operation and maintenance  (O&M)  costs and 1 per cent of capital costs (calculated  at historical  prices
without taking care of the gestation  lag factor).  In addition, the Committee  recommended  that the
irrigation commands should limit themselves to wholesale distribution of water with volumetric
pricing to farmer groups who would be responsible for the subsequent water distribution and
management  of the system over areas of up to about 500 hectares.  While we strongly agree that
such reforms -if implementable  -would constitute  major improvements  on the present situation, we
wonder why the Committee has suggested that only one per  cent of capital costs should be
recovered.  That might be a strategic  compromise,  but we feel that basic principles should not be
19relegated to the background, and that fall recovery of the relevant capital costs ( after allowing for
urban beneficiaries  and public good externalities  aue  as flood control etc) should be the long run
target.  Secondly. we suggest that experiments  sbould begin to make project authorities/irrigation
departments  financially  and operationally  autonomous. This could be combined  with initiatives to
make the farmers ca-owners  of the irrigation systems  by issuing 'water bonds' to the tune of -say -
five  per cent of tae equity of the system. This could be made somewhat  compulsory  in the sense
that water would le supplied on a priority basis (or only) to those who 'own' the system through
equity participation. This would  help recover some part of the capital cost, and also contribute  to
farmers feeling that the irrigation  system which supplies  them also in part belongs to them, thereby
inducing  them to take greater interest in its mnanagement.
The institution of arrangements under which farmers pay for  the cost of  canal water
delivered  to them will reduce the wasteful  use of water, contribute  to better water allocation  within
irrigation commands, provide funds for improved operation and maintenance 2,  and somewhat
reduce the rent seeking activity  generated  by the present administrative  methods  by which water is
allocated in most systems.  However, on its own, this reform cannot efficiently allocate water
between different users, and mechanisms  need to be found by which the supply of water to farmers
and other users is responsive to the value it has to them.  By far the most promising method for
achieving this aim would be to create conditions which would allow the existence of efficient
markets  in tradeable  water rights A i  avincing case for tradeable water rights is made, and the
extensive literature on the subject surveyed,in  a recent paper by Rosegrant  and Binswanger  (1993).
If rights to the delivery of water can be freely bought and sold, farmers with new crops or in new
areas will be able to obtain water provided they are willing to pay more than its value to existing
users, and established  users will take account of its sale value in deciding on what and how much
to produce.  In this way there is great potential for mitigating some of the pervasive problems of
Indian irrigation commands,  for example  the 'tail ender' problem where farmers at the top ends of
the canal systems obtain ample water to cultivate water intensive  crops such as rice and sugar cane,
while down-canal  farmers are starved of water even though its marginal  value to them may greatly
exceed its value to the up-canal users.  Ideally, the creation of a market for water should be
accompanied  by reforms which charge  users for the marginal cost of delivery i.e marginal  operation
and maintenance costs for deliveries within established networks, and marginal operation and
delivery costs plus incremental  capital costs if new investment  is needed. In this way farmers (and
non-farm  users) will be obliged  to take these costs into account in making their trades.  However,
the institution  of tradeable water rights will lead to a very substantially  improved - if not fully
optimal  - allocation  of water, even In the absence  of proper recovery  of marginal  delivery costs.
In India, as e'sewhere, it may be politically  extremely  difficult, or even impossible,  to fully recover
these costs, since farmers strenuously resist increasese  in water charges, which amounts to the
expropriation  of economic  rents built into land values. While we believe  that strong and continuing
attempts should nevertheless be made, at the same time the government should push the reforms
needed  to establish  water  markets  e.g. the conditions  and institutions  required for contract  monitoring
and  enforcement, reliable water delivery and measurement, mechanisms for  internalising or
otherwise  taking account of the interests of third parties etce
The electricity  subsidy  to the rural sector has already crossed Rs 40 billion ( $US 1.3 billion
) per annum. The pricing of electricity  for rural areas is one of the major reasons that most state
electricity boards (SEBs) are in the red, and it is becoming increasingly difficult to sustain this
financial burden. With the rapid energisation  of indian agriculture, coupled with the existence  of a
flat rate tariff for electric purnpsets  in most states, this subsidy increased especially  rapidly during
the 1980s. The flat rate system means that the marginal cost of additional electricity use falls to
almost  zero, which  provides an incentive  to go for water  heavy crops based on groundwater  reserves
20even in areas of low rainfall. The widespread  emergence  of paddy in the Punjab-Haryana  belt is a
case In  point. While the annual rainfall  of this region is about 60 cms, irrigated  paddy requires  more
than 200 cms, although its consumptive use is less.  This requirement for irrigation water is
primarily being met through groundwater tube wells running on electricity.  In a country where
electricity is a very scarce resource, and its opportunity cost is not below Rs 2/kwh7, agriculture
gets this resource at throw- away  prices. In Pmjab, for example  ,the average revenue from farmers
is less than 7 paiselkwh against an average state wide cost of generation  and distribution of more
than 110  paise/kwh. The story is not very different in other states (Gulati  and Katula, 1992). Tamil
Nadu in fact supplies power to its farmers totally free.  Populist measures  of this kind are clearly
incompatible  with the efficient  use of this scarce resource.8
We have three suggestions  for reforms in the provision  of power to the rural sector.  First,
the state electricity  boards should be made more accountable  to consumers as regards their costs of
operation and  generation.  Their  costs should be  scrutinised by  agencies which incorporate
representatives  of consumer  groups, including  farmers. The structure  of electricity  tariffs and tariff
increases  should be debated in public and the relevant  cost and demand  data should  be made publicly
available.  This would help induce the SEBs to  economise on their costs of generation and
distribution. Second, the flat rate system for pumpsets  should be replaced  by volumetric  pricing by
installing  meters. The early argument  that the cost of installing  meters and administering  volumetric
pricing would not justify the benefits is no longer valid (if it ever was) iz view of the manifold
increase in the level of electricity consumption  by Indian agriculture in recent years.  Third, the
distribution of electricity should be increasingly  transferred to the private sector on an attractive
commission basis, especially the distribution  to agriculture.  Some farmers'  cooperatives might be
particularly suited to this task.  While the government  has stated that electricity  generation is now
open to  the private sector,'  higher priority should be given to private sector participation in
electricity  distribution  and in the collection  of dues.
The ability to subsidise farmers through rural credit is an ace card with the politicians. It
is therefore not surprising that there has been pervasive political interference culminating in the
extremely damaging loan waiver scheme which was a direct outcome of the 1989 elections.  At
present the farming sector is starved  of funds, and the whole process of rural lending is in jeopardy.
The annual subsidy  to farmers through concessional  rates of interest and bad debts is in excess of
Rs 30 billion ($US 1 billion), the amount depending  upon the definition  used to measure it (Katula
and Gulati, 1992). Although  the required reforms of rural credit involve  far reaching and difficult
reforms of the whole banking and financial system3s,  in present circumstances  we feel that three
reforms could be carried out without generating  a great deal of opposition. First, the concessions
on rates of interest for rural loans should be reduced and then abolished, while increasing the
availability of credit.  Secondly, efforts should be made to evolve group lending in rural areas,
where members of the group act as sureties for each other. In case of default by any member, the
entire group may be sued and banned  from further loans. Thirdly, defaults  with a two to three year
bistory  should be treated severely under present laws, perhaps through special tribunals.  Unless
financial reforms along these lines are initiated, the process of recyc!ing deposits, loans and
recoveries will continue to be disrupted  and an inflexible  rural credit system is likely to slow down
the response of agriculture to  the kinds of trade policy, regulatory and other changes that are
urgently needed.
As emphasised later ,  the required reforms of iertiliser pricing and distribution, canal
irrigation, electricity  and rural credit are likely to be polid,ally extremely  difficult. To increase  the
chance that they will be implemented,  it is important  th;* they are perceived  to be part of a reform
21package in which farmers gain from reforms on the output side which on average involve real price
increas  for agricultural  products, while paying  higher prices for these inputs.  If the output and
Input reforms are not tied together, and efforts to remove  the input  subsidies  are delayed, the gains
from the output price reforms are liely  to be pocketed  by the farmers with little or no action on the
input side.
I.  Removi  controls and distorions associated  with the 'food securit'  conmlex
This is the source of the largest and most pervasive  distortions  and inefficiencies  in domestic
agricultural markets, including the two-price systems for major commoditdes  both at procurement
oevy prices etc.) and distribution,  and the associated  rent seeking. The Essenial Commodides  Act
is also an important  source of distortions  and rent seeking.' 1 Apart from the powerful groups with
vested interests  in the system as it now funcdons, the main stumbling  blocks to reform are the need
to retain some way of permanently  reaching low income  and deprived groups and dealing promptly
with drought and other emergencies, both local and nationwide.  Various approaches are possible.
The most far reaching would rely on food stamps:  a second less radical reform would keep the fair
price shops but drastically  change other aspects  of the present system.
(i) Food  Mns.  The main elements  of a reform based on food stamps would be:
-Food stamps would be issued  to low income  households  based on income/wealth  criteria and used
to buy from private retalers  according to the type of food stamp system adopted.  They could be
administered by the states and reimbursed (according to a variety of formulas) by the central
government. The food stamp system would replace  the PDS, which would be abolished.
-The central government  would be responsible  for policies (for example,  vaiable export  and import
duties  and subsidies  related to a moving  average of world prices, as discussed  previously,  or, failing
that, a buffer stock system) aimed a! preventing excessive  peaks and troughs in domestic prices.
However, it would be important  not to inhibit normal seasonal and regional price variations which
reflect carrying, marketing  and transport costs. Insofar as overall stabiisation continues  to involve
direct goveroment interventions, purchases and sales would only be  made in major wholesale
markets. Storage  and transport  of buffer/emergency  stocks  could  be subcontracted  out to the private
sector.
-The periodic imposition  of physical  and other controls  on traders to prevent  the movement  of grain
out of the surplus north west region would cease.
-As at present, the Centre in combination  with the states would intervene in regions affected  by
drought or other emergencies,  by emergency  work programs (including food-for-work  prcSrams),
sales in local wholesale  markelt, etc. Some of FCI's storage facilities in drought prone areas could
be retained for this purpose, although again these fumctions  could also be subcontracted  out to the
private sector.
-FCI and NAFED would get out of the business  of physically handling gris  and other prmary
commodites.  Taking delivery, storage and arranging shipment would all be done by the private
sector.
22-The levy price systems for rice, sugar and molasses  would be abolished.
-Lnports and exports of wheat, coarse  grains, and edible oils would be freely made by the private
sector without restriction.  Exports and imports of rice and sugar would be freely made by the
private sector, but subject to special tariff/export tax treatment as mentioned  earlier.
(ii) Reforming the PDS systm  If the reform program were based (at least in its initial
stages) on keeping  the fair price shops and ration cards rather than on a food stamp system, it would
still be possible  to do this while  keeping  most of the reforms mentioned  above. One approach  would
be to decentralise procurement for the fair price shops and for emergency stocks down to some
regional level. That is, a regional  organisation  with storage capability  (preferably  subcontracted  out
to the private sector) would  take bids for the delivery  of the grains needed  for a network of fair price
shops for which it would be responsible.  In order to support low income targeting the grains
purchased  would be at the low end of the quality spectrum.  They could  be purchased  from anywhere
(locally,  from the surplus  north west areas, imported),  from anyone, and delivered  to whatever  time
schedule corresponded  best with the demand from the regional FPS network.  The organisation
would be reimbursed for the difference  between its purchases and other costs and its receipts from
the FPS network sales.  Emergency  stocks and expenses would be accounted for and subsidised
separately.  Incentives would have to be established for the management  of the organisation to
optimise its purchases in the light of the demand.
In order to  concentrate  the benefits  on low income  households,  it would be highly desirable
to restrict the issue of ration cards on the basis of whatever  information  is available  on income and
wealth (as is now being done in seven states). This would have the further advantage  of reducing
leakage from  the system back to  the open market and perhaps to  the  regional procurement
organisation.
If this or any other version of the present PDS, edible oils and sugar should be removed
from  the  system,  which  would handle only  rice,  wheat and  coarse grains  (and perhaps
gur/khandasari instead of sugar).  PDS wheat and rice should be at the low end of the quality
spectrum in order introduce some measure of self targeting.
Edible oils should be removed from the PDS for two reasons. First, PDS prices have
consistently  been maintained  and remain at approximately  double  border prices: liberalising  edible
oil imports  (see discussion  below) will make  much  cheaper  edible oil available  to everyone,  including
low income  consumers  not reached by the PDS. Secondly,  more than half of the edible oil allocated
to the PDS is diverted (much  of it in bulk to edible oil refineries well before reaching the fair price
shops), and only about  one fifth actually  reaches consumers  in the bottom  40 per cent of the income
d&-tribution.
Sugar should be removed for similar reasons. Firstly, it is a small share of the budgets of
low income households. Secondly, removing it and abolishing  the levy on sugar mills will bring
down free market prices substantiaily,  since the levy share of total sugar sales is normally high
(currently  45%). Thirdly, on average domestic  sugar prices have been well above world prices and
can be expected  to decline with trade liberalisation,  even though sugar is one of the commodities
which qualifies for special treatment of some kind owing to the narrowness  of the world market in
relation to ldian  demand and supply.  Fourthly, about a third of the sugar supplied to PDS is
estimated to be diverted.  Fifth, it has been suggested that in some regions gur and low quality
23khandsari  could  be distributed  through  fair price  shops  in place  of sugar,  on the argument  that this
would  automatically  target  the consunption  to low  income  groups. Finally,  the removal  of sugar
is likely  to reduce  the attractiveness  of the PDS  to middle  and higher  income  households  and  thus
facilitate  targeting.
HI  Removine  Other  Domestic  Regulatory  Controls  and  Distortions:
These can be roughly  classified  under  four main  headings,  although  there is considerable
overlapping  among  th'. first three.
(i)  Renoving  controls  on markets,  traders and processors  and subsidies  to cooperatives:
These affect  the markets  for all agricultural  products,  although  their application  is often
commodity  specific. Thcy  are  the responsibility  of the Central  government,  but there  may  be some
additional  state  controls  and  subsidies.  Reform  would  involve:
-Abolishing  the Essential  Commodities  Act;
-Abolishing  the general  ban on futures  trading;
-Abolishing  inventory  controls;
-Abolishing  selective  credit  controls  on inventory  financing;
-Removing  the discrimination  of Indian  Railways  in favor  of shipments  by parastatals;
-Treating  farmer cooperatives  on an equal footing  with the private sector, i.e.,
removing  their preferential  access to  subsidised  credit, their preferential  tax
treatment,  their exemption  from various  regulatory  rules applied  to private  firms,
and direct  subsidies.
A general  problem  will be that  the  inventory  and credit  controls  are perceived  as technuques
for preventing  the private sector from  offsetting  inventory  accumulation  or decumulation  by
parastatals  such  as FCI, NAFED,  the Cotto  l Corporation  of India,  etc.
(i) Abolishing  state-implemented  movement  controls:
These  include:
-The  Maharashtra  monopoly  procurement  scheme  for cotton;
- The isolation  of Thanjavur  district  in Tamil  Nadu  for rice  procurement;
-Gujarat's  periodic  movement  controls  on groundnuts  and groundnut  oil.
It is possible  that  other  state-implemented  movement  controls  exist.  Because  of the obvious
local  political  sensitivity,  removal  of the controls  would  probably  have  to be accompanied  by some
offsetting  benefits  (e.g. would  a substanial  long  term improvement  in cotton  prices  resulting  from
open  trade  in cotton  be sufficient  to offset  the  perceived  benefits  of the Maharashtra  cotton  scheme?)
(ill)  Removing  commodity-speciflc  controls:
There  are  large  numbers  of  regulatory  controls  (which  affect  farming,  marketing,  distribution
and  processing)  implemented  by commodity  boards  and  by central  and  state  government  departes,
24which reduce economic  efficiency  in the industries to which they are applied.  For example, the
Tobacco Board attempts  to set annual  production  quotas  for each one of more than 10,000  individual
growers  of  Virginia tobacco. Controls of  this  kind,  which  are  clearly inefficient, largely
unenlforceable  or both, should be identified  and abolished. At the same time the roles of each of the
commodity  boards or of other Intervening  agencies  should  be assessed  and specific  reform progrms
(which may involve their abolition  or substantial  changes  in their functions)  should be developed.
By way of illustration, we make some suggestions  below for removing domestic controls
from from five major commodities  -wheat, rice, sugar, cotton, and oilseeds .
(a)As  regards ykhn,  informal  movement  restrictions  have  often been Imposed  on the surplus
states of Punjab, Haryana and on western Uttar Pradesh so that the govemmont's requirements  for
the PDS and for buffer stocks can be purchased  at the official  procurement  price.  In his February
1993  budget  speech,  the Finance  Minister  announced  a welcome  general  policy change, under which
there would be no further administrative  restrictions  on movements  of agricultural  products within
the country. It should be made clear that the new policy wiUl  also mean that the government will
no longer pressure private traders to shun the primary grain markets, as was done in the marketing
season of  1992.-2 The government should also announce and commit itself to  support prices
(covering say the bulk line Raid  out costs'  of the farmes),  while procurement should be done at
market prices In competition  with the private trade in the open market.  Farmers should have the
right to sel  to anyone offering  better prices. This is important  becuse informal controls on either
the movement  of wheat or on the participation  of the private trade in the market, lead to aU sorts
of corruption within each state and at state borders, and undercut the support of this politically
Important farmer group for any  general program of  agricultural reforms.  Furthermore, the
uncertiny  and transaction costs involved reduce the attractiveness of  wheat production and
contribute  to farmers switching  to other crops that do not face the same movement  controls, such
as oilseeds.'3
(b)ln the case of ni,  rice millers in the three major surplus states are at present subject  to
a levy (i.e. compulsory  acquisition  at  fixed  prices ) of 75 per cent of their production in Haryana
and Punjab and 50 per cent in Andhra  Pradesh.'  A visit to these rice mills easily reveals how they
try to evade this levy, and how they succeed in avoiding  the minimum  quality conrol and supply
the poorest quality rice to the procurement  agencies,  all at the cost of the exchequer. The economic
rents in this system  are largely  approprated by the millers and by the inspectors  and other employees
of the procurement  agencies. The levy system should be eliminated  e.g. in Punjab and Haryana,
by reducing the levy percentage  from 75% to 50% in the first year, to 25% in the second year, and
fully witdrawing it in the third year. As long as the PDS remains  the chief means  of providing  food
to low income groups ,to meet its procurement  targets, the government  should invite tenders from
rice mis  and procure from the lowest bidders. If the PDS is decentralized  as suggested  previously,
these bids could be for delivery to the location  served by the regional or state agency  requirig  the
rice.  At the same time ,as for wheat, the governt  should provide a support price for paddy
based on the bulk line paid out costs of the farmers.  With the market determining  the prices of
milled rice,there would be an incentive  for millers to upgrade their techology  and to reduce the
breakage ratio. At present, the signals are in fiat in the opposite  direction. Many millers also install
small inefficient  hullers, which are exeempt  from the levy, and in recent years the number of such
hullers has increased  in the northern belt.  Furthermore,  rice milling is reserved for the smaU  scale
sector, which deters larger modemnsing  investments. It should  be removed from this reserved list.
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varieties,  and thereby  would  increase  the incentive  of farmers  to produce  them.
(c)In  the case  of ag,  the established  mills  have  to deliver  a fixed  proportion  (currently  4S
per cent)  of their  production  to the  government  at a fixed  levy  price  which  generaly does  not cover
their full  production  costs. They  are expected  to compensate  this from  open  market  sales  of sugar.
But  even  In the open  market,  sales of sugar  are regulated  by a system  of releases  which  allocates  a
centrally  determined  sales  quota  to each  one of the approximately  386  sugar  mills  each  month. In
addition,  they are subject  to controlled  minimum  prices  for their purchases  of sugar cane and a
variety  of other controls,  including  compulsory  crushing  quotas  and mandatory  crushing  periods
duriog  seasons  of excess  cane  production.  Furthermore  molasses  (the  principal  by-product  of sugar
milling)  is under  a 100  percent  levy  at  prices  which  are generally  less  than  a quarter  of open  market
prices. By  contrast  with  established  mills,new  sugar  mills  and  expansions  in the  capacity  of ecisting
mills  are exempt  from the sugar levy  for periods  of from  5 to 10  years, depending  on where  they
located. Together  with  the other  controls,  this artificial  incentive  to the establishment  of new  mills
and new capacity  is an important  reason  for persistent  excess  capacity  and widespread  "industrial
sickness"  (i.e. bankrupt  and loss making  mills) in this industrym  Given the poor financial
condition  of many  sugar  mills 3 a,  and the large scale  evasion  of the molasses  levy,  we suggest  that
molasses  should  be decorolled  immediately  38.  It is difficult  to think of a justification  for
subsidising  the consumers  of alcohol  at the expense  of consumers  of sugar. Next,  the sugar levy
should  be removed. This could  be done  by reducing  it in the first  year from  45 percent  to say 20
percent,  and withdrawing  it totally  in the following  year. For reasons  given earlier,  it would  be
better to remove  sugar from the PDS.  If the government  wishes  to continue  subsidising  sugar
consumers  through  the PDS, it should  be procured  by competitive  tendering  from the sugar  mills,
as recommended  for rice.  Storage  could  also be arranged  by competitive  tendering  in which  the
mills would  doubtless  participate  in order to use the storage  capacity  they have built to store
government  owned  sugar  under  the  present  systemY Elsewhere  (see Bhide  and Gulati,  1992),  we
have  als  argued  for delicensing  of the sugar industry. Among  other things,  this would  help to
circumvent  the problems  created  by the fact  that  the states  often  set much  higher  minimnum  prices
for sugar  cane  than  the minimum  prices  recommended  by the  Commission  on Agricultural  Costs  and
Prices  and  announced  by the central  government.
(d)As  regards  , monopsonistic  purchases  by the Maharashtra  State  Cotton  Markedng
Federation  (often  referred  to as  monopoly  procurement  of cotton  in Maharashtra)  distorts  the  national
cotton  market.  It often  leads  to "smuggling"  of cotton  between  Maharashtra  and adjoiing states
whenever  the prices in these  states  are higher  or lower  than  the buying  prices  of the Maharashtra
Federation.  The Cotton  Corporation  of India  already  provides  a nationwide  set of floor  prices for
cotton  as insurance  against  any drastic  collapse  of market  prices, and it is difficult  to see the
rationale  for the continued  monopoly  procurement  operations  of the Federation.  A second  urgently
needed  reform  is the  removal  of sate govenmment  controls  over ginning  margins,  which  is a serious
impediment  to the badly  needed  m  saon  of this indutry.
(e)  As regards edible  oils and oilseeds  , the suggestions  made earlier for trade policy
reforms,  in particular  removing  STCY'  iamport  monopoly  of edible  oils and  progressively  loweing
Import  tariffs,would  be incompatible  with the price maitnce  and buffer stocking  scheme  at
present  managed  by the National  Dairy  Development  Board. This  scheme  should  be abolished.  In
July 1991  the  processing  of oilseeds  was  liberalised  in a significant  way  by the fact  that  the vanaspati
industry  and the solvent  extraction  idustry were among  the many  industries  freed  from industrW
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which the Ministry of Food and Civil Supplies  applies  to the vanaspati  industry should  be removed.
These Include  informal  price controls, controls  on the processes which can be used, controls on the
kinds and quantities  of crude oil inputs, and a complicated  system of differential excise tax rebates
aimed at encouraging  the use of oils from ricebran and minor oilseeds. Secondly, the reservation
of oilseed crushing for small scale industry should be  abolished, as it creates an artificial barrier
between activities which in other countries  are predominantly  carried on by integrated  firms. It is
also a deterrent to direct investment  by foreign firms in the oilseed processing industry, which the
government's general liberalisation  of the foreign equity and technology  rules (also in 1991) was
intended to encourage.
Especially  for the above mentioned  five commoditlfs,  which account for more than half of
India's gross cropped area and value of crop output, we feel that the time has come to allow and to
promote futures trading.  rutures trading had been bannad for many years on the argument that it
encourages  speculation,  and during years of acute shortaje, exploits consumers. Conditions  have
dramatically  changed since these arguments had some popular appeal.  While some varieties of
cotton have been opened up for futures trading lately, after a gap of more than 25 years, these
reforms for cotton should be broadened and extended  to other commodities. Futures markets have
an important role to play in stabiising commodity  markets.  Their existence  will be particularly
important  for domestic  food industries  such as oilseed  processing  to be internationally  competitive,
since they are critical  for dealing with risk and uncertainty  in the face of constantly  fluctuating  prices
and fine margins between  the various processing  stages.
(iv) Removing agriculture's  exemption from income tax:
Under the Indian  constitution,  income  tax on agricultural  incomes  is a state subject, but only
seven states actually levy such a tax, and the revenue from it is very low to negligible.  For the
purposes  of the cental government  income  tax, agricultural  income is supposed  to be combined  with
non- agricultural  income in determining  marginal  tax rates on non- agricultural income. However,
as a result of the way this provision is worded the reported additional  tax collections  are negligible,
and the provision has not effectively  prevented large scale evasion  of income taxes by individuals
who arrange their affairs  to show that most of their income is from agriculture (Gupta, 1991). As
shown previously, this de facto exemption  of agricultural incomes from taxation  does not amount
to much in the aggregate  when compared  to the trade related measures  and the non-traded  subsidies
affecting agricultural incentives.  Nevertheless, it distorts choices between agricultural and non
agricultural activities, and the extent of the distortion will grow as income taxes become more
important sources of government revenue, as is normally the case in  the course of economic
development. Since the overall effects of the reforms we are suggesting will be to significantly
improve real farm incomes, we believe that this would be an appropriate time for the states to
reconsider their present policies and to introduce taxes on farm incomes at somewhere  about the
levels of the central government  income  taxes on non-farm  incomes. Because  the central exemption
levels ensure that only relatively  high incomes  are subject  to any tax, this would not affect marginal
and small farmers. At the same time, it would make a badly
needed contribution  to state government  revenues and would remove an important  avenue for the
evasion  of the central  government  income  tax.  It could  be made more palatable  to farmers if it were
used to help finance increased state expenditure  on rural infrastructure.
27IIL  Policy  Reforms  : Some  General  Suggestions
The broad  objectives  of reforms  in the medium  or long  term, and  the tactics  for the short
run suggested  above, are comprehensive  and ambitious. In order to get reform under way,
experience  from  Indian  manufacturing  and  agriculture,  and  liberalisation  episodes  in other  countries
suggest  that  the following  would  be useful:
- Include  at an early stage  a "demonstration  liberalisation",  i.e., the liberalisation  of an
industry  which  is likely  to have  an early  and readily  apparent  favorable,  positive  impact  as regards
output  and employment.
-As far as possible,  combine  reforms  with  a contractionary  impact  with  reforms  which  are
likely  to be expansionary,  either  with regard  to the same crops,  or crops to which  the adversely
affected  farmers  can switch.
- Do not allow  the reform  process  to become  hung  up on attempts  to retain  price stability
over time  and territorial  price uniformity.  Commodity  prices are inherentdy  unstable:  to have any
chance of implementing  substantive  liberalising  reforms with an appropriate  role for private
intermediaries  and processors,  this needs  to be recognised.
-Do not build up overoptimistic  expectations  that the reforms will necessarily  lead
immediately  to a noticeable  increase  in the growth  of the farm sector  and in rural incomes  and
employment.  Although  some  farming  activities  and  regions  are likely  to gain  in the  short  run, others
are likely  to lose or at least  face  a difficult  period  of adjustment.  It may  take  several  years  before
higher  growth  in the whole  farm sector  becomes  apparent,  and even  that may  be delayed  or even
prevented  altogether  by a variety  of factors.  It is better  to be realistic  about  possible  future  problems
and  prospects.  Disappointed,  overoptimistic  popular  expectations  can  easily  lead  to policy  reversals.
- Studies  of the  various  kinds  will be needed  , but it is vital that  they  be clearly  focussed  on
the issues  at hand in the reform  process. Broad,  unfocused  studies  can muddy  the issues,  drag  on
for too long,  and  just serve  as an excuse  for delaying  effective  action.
As regards  a "demonstration  liberalisation  n", the Indian  debate  on many  of the issues  is
highly  ideological.  For historical  and other reasons  there  is in particular  a deep  seated  distrust  of
private traders and processors  and private markets in general,  not only in the ministries  and
parastatals  but amongst  economists  who  work  on agricultural  subjects.  The resulting  interventions
and regulatory  controls  emasculate  or distort the operations  of the private  sector and expand  the
scope  for rent seeking  and  black  economy  activities,  which  reinforces  the prevailing  conviction  that
it is inherently  deficient  as well  as corrupt. In order  to help  break  down  this self  fulfilling  process
of distrust  and control,  it would  be helpful  at an early stage  to have a successful  'demonstration
liberalisation".  The  evident  and  widely  recognised  success  of  the deregulation  of the cement  industry
in the  early  1980s  greatly  helped  in mobilising  support  for  the broader  deregulation  of manufacuring
which  came  later.
In our opinion  the cotton  industry  would  be an excellent  candidate  for such  a "demonstration
liberalisation'  for the  rest of agriculture,  although  a start  should  be made  on  other  fronts  at the same
time.  The case for an early concentration  on cotton  is that, because  of India's comparative
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(including  minimum  export  prices)  is likely  to lead  to a substantial  Increase  in the export  of these
varieties  and to a corresponding  increases  in production  amd  employment  . Furthermore  , unlike
cotton  yarn  and fabrics,  the international  market  for cotton  is reatively  open and in particular  is
wt restricted  by the multi-fiber  arrangement  which  creates  difficulties  for exports  of textiles  to
developed  country  markets.  Simultaneously  with  the removal  of export  controls,  imports  should  also
be allowed  without  import  licensing  or other  controls  and  with  a zero  tariff. While  domestic  prices
are well below  intenational  prices as at present,  there will be no or few imports,  but allowing
imports  without  any  restriction  will  ensure  that  the  textile  industry  is not  injured  as a result  of future
shortages  due to drought  or other  events,  especially  shortages  of coarser  cottons  in the production
of which  India  has less of an advantage.  As noted  earlier,  as a by -product,  by aligning  domestic
and world prices ,the opening  of cotton exports  and imports  would  also contribute  to greater
economic  efficiency  in the textile  industry.  As  well  as these  trade  reforms,  a policy  reform  package
for the industry  would  also include  the domestic  regulatory  reforms  referred  to earlier,  namely:
-Removal  of the export  quota  allocations  to the  CCI,  the Maharashtra  Federation  and  similar
organisatons  and  the creation  of conditions  for eff-ctve  export  marketing  by the private  sector. The
present  regulatory  functions  of the Ministry  of Textiles  over  the cotton  industry  would  be abolished.
-Removal  of the general  export  controls  on cotton  yarn  (except  for the controls  required  by
the multi-fiber  arrangement  ).
-General  permission  for futures  trading,  which  in the case  of the cotton  industry  could  be
rapidly  and effectively  implemented.
-Removal  of inventory  controls  from cotton  traders  and  textile  firms.
- Reviews  of the roles of CCI  and  the Maharashtra  Federation  and  ensuing  reforms  which
enure that  they  do not impede  or distort  trade  in cotton.
-Removal  of the state  ginning  margin  controls  and the creation  of conditions  which  would
make  investment  in the modernisation  of cotton  ginning  attractive  to private  industry.
We believe  that this reform package  would encourage  new investment  and increased
competition  at  all stages  in the production  and  distribution  of cotton,  and  in particular  would  improve
the quality of Indian  cottons  and its markedtng  both  domestically  and  in export  markets.
There are obvious  advantages  in reform  packages  which  include  ezansionary  refornm
which  would  partly or fully  offset  contractona  reforms. A few examples:
-Reductions  in the non-traded  subsidies  (canal  irrigation,  electricity  and credit)  should  be
accompanied  by increases  in the selling  prices  of grains  and  cotton,  which  in turn  would  follow  from
the removal  of export  controls  and  from  general  trade and  domestic  deregulation  in the markets  for
these  products.  In particular,  abolition  of the compulsory  levy  prices  for sugar  and  rice  would  benefit
these  farmers  in a clear  way  which  would  be apparent  to them  and  everyone  else.  This  change  could
be included  in a reform  package  involving  increased  charges  for inputs.
- Decontrol  of grains  and cotton,  leading  to higher  prices,  could  help  offset  decontrol  and
reduced  protection  for oilseeds  and sugar.
-In the south,  decontrol  and higher  prices  for rice, spices  coffee and  tea could  help  offset
lower  protecdon  and  reduced  prices  for rubber  and cocomut/copra.
As regards price stablity and  tertorlal  price uniformity, seasonal  variations  and
differences  which  reflect  local conditions  and transport  costs  are necessary  for the efficient  timing
and  location  of production.  With  the agricultural  economy  open  to international  trade, local  prices
29should  also reflect  these  t  opporunies.  It may be economically  efficient,  for example,  to
Import  a commodity  during  part of the year  and  export  it during  another  part of the  year (especially
in regions  bordeing neighbouring  countries).  Likewise,  it may  be economically  efficient  to import
a commodity  In  one  part of the country  while  exporting  the same  commodity  from  another  location.
Efficient  resource  allocation  may  also  require  substandal  price  variations  from year  to year  and  over
longer  periods. Excessive  preoccupation  with  stability  over time and  with  geographical  uniformity
could  make  any substauive  liberalisation  of the present  controls  very difficult  to achieve. In this
regard,  a few  general  commentB  are worth  malking.  First, as is well  known,  price  stability  is not the
same  as income  stability  for fiamers. Secondly,  insulation  from  or only partial  exposure  to world
markets  does  not of itself  guarantee  stable  prices:  for example,  in certain  respects  domestic  cotton
prices  have  been  less stable  than  they would  have  been  if they  had been  direcdy linked  to world
cotton  prices. Thirdly,  Indian  farmers  in this  and  other  industries  (e.g., pulse  farmers,  whose  prices
have  been  principally  determined  by import  prices  since  the early 1980s)  have  lived  with unstable
prices  without  disastrous  consequences,  even  though  regulatory  controls  have  gready  inhibited  the
extent  to which  they  themselves  &/or private  intermediaries  have  been  able  to deal with  the price
risk. Fourthly,  as a reform  strategy,  farmers  (including  farmers  producing  the major  grains)  may
be willing  to trade  off less  price  stability  for a higher  general  level  of prices.
As regards the need to  avoid building up  overoptimistic  expcatlons,  even if a
thoroughgoing  reform  program  were implemented,  it is important  to recognise  that the supply
response  of agriculture  as a whole  is likely  to be quite  low in the short run, even  if the longer  run
impact  is substantial.  Whereas  increases  in incentives  for individual  crops can  elicit  large  increases
in production  in the course  of a season  as farmers  switch  from  other  crops  , the aggregate  short  and
even  medium  term  (say  over three  or four  years)  response  of the whole  farming  sector  is limited  by
the supply  of agricultural  land  and  by the time  required  for new  on- farm, off-farm  and  especially
infrastructure  investment  to take place.4°  The short term response  could also be delayed  for a
variety  of other  reasons. For one  thing,  the impact  of reforms  will  be muted  if they  are incomplete
or delayed:  for example,  if, for political  reaons the excessive  protection  of the edible  oil sector  is
not taclded, or  if reforms are made on the output side, but the major input subsidies  and
inefficiencies  are not  touched. Secondly,  the response  to the reforms  may  be held  back  by delays
in or inattention  to required  infrastructure  investments.  In  fact, this is already  emerging  as a
problem  as a result  of the budgetary  squeeze  on central  and especially  state  government  spending
associated  with  the stabilisation  program  put in place  to deal  with the 1991  macroeconomic  crisis.
Thirdly, the response  of agriculture  could be reduced  by difficulties  or delays in introducing
complementary  reforms  in such things  as agricultural  credit, land tenure etc.  Fourthly,  if the
government  continues  to follow  its stated  intention  and  reduces  maufcturg  protecdon, we have
argued  that agriculture  -and particularly  agricultural  exports  - wiUl  benefit  substantiaUy  if the real
exchange  rate is devalued  to keep the trade deficit  under  control. But in some  Latin  American
countries  the early  stages  of trade  liberalisation  has been  accompanied  by substntial  capital  inflows
which  have  allowed  imports  to increase  with  a smaller  devaluation  than  would  otherwise  have  been
required,  or even  with  a strengthening  of the exhage  rate. EspeciaUy  because  of the window  for
short  term  capital  inflows  resulting  from  India's  schemes  for borrowing  from  non-  resident  Indians,
this possibilty cannot  be preduded and could reduce the short or even medium  term output
responses  of all the tradeable  sectors,  including  agriculture.  However,  for various  reasons  it is less
likely  to do so in the longer  run4 1
As regards  economic  sudies, there is an extensive  empirical  economic  literature  in India,
some  of high quality. Some  studies  provide  a directly  relevant  background  for a reform  program,
in particular  the Gulati-Pursell  et al studies  which  describe  and  provide  quantitative  estimates  of the
30incentives  provided by the trade regime and other interventions  for most but not all major crops.
But  most of the Indian literature takes the present policy environment  (e.g. food self sufficiency,
controls over private traders, managed trade, role of PDS and FCI etc) for granted, and there are
many gaps in what is known on subjects which are highly relevant if one is considering policy
reforms of the kind suggested above. For example, the likely impact on handloom weavers is
inevitably  cited as a reason for not decontrolling  exports of cotton, yet to our knowledge  there is no
good empirical economic  study of exactly how these controls  benefit the weavers or c  "sow  these
benefits (assuming  some exist) would stack  up against  the broader economic benefits  of decontrol.
In the absence  of objective  studies, policy makers shy away from  reform in the face of vociferous
objections  from the handloom  lobby as well as from the textile industry  which also objects  to losing
the implicit subsidy  on cotton.  As another  example, as far as we know, there is no thoroughgoing
study  of the economic  efficiency  of the procurement,  storage and transport operations  of FCI, even
though periodic comments by knowledgeable  people and some work relying on published data
suggests that there are major problems.  Likewise, there is no economic  study of the edible oil
importing  and distribution  operations  of STC or of the fertiliser  importing  and distributionoperations
of MMTC. As far as we know, there are also no good up-to-date  analytic studies of the rationale
for and operations  of the various commodity  boards and the policy environments  of the coffee, tea,
cocoa,  jute and spices industries.
There are also serious  gaps in what is known  about  the combined  expenditures  of the central
and of the state governments and of  relevant central and state enterprises on  investments in
infrastructure  which underpin  agricultural  development. As noted previously,  public infrastructure
inadequacies  could seriously impede  the adjustment  of agriculture  to the kinds of reforms we have
been  proposing  e.g. deficiencies  in irrigation  systems, agricultural  research, electricity  supply,  roads,
railways, ports, telecommunications,  and even more fundamentally,  in things such as basic health
care and primary education  in rural areas.
Although  the state of lnowledge is quite adequate  for getting a reform process started, in
some areas studies on topics such as those me;wioned  above will be needed to support the process
or to prepare the way for some reforms. If well focussed  on directly  relevant issues, in many cases
there should be no need for extensive, time consuming  research which might seriously delay the
introduction and implementation  of reforms.  Short reports or briefs summarising the relevant
existing literature  or involving  only the systematic  collection  of basic knowledge  which is or should
be easily available  (the cooperation  of the ministries  and parastatals  involved  will usually  be needed,
however), good economic  analysis  and common  sense should usually suffice.
However in other areas there is a need for longer term research which could  proceed in the
background  of the reform process without  delaying  it.  In particular, as noted above, there is a need
for systematic  studies  of the efficiency  and appropriateness  of government  expenditures  and of ways
of financing it.  It would also be useful to update the Gulati-Pursell  et al incentive studies and to
extend them to crops not so far covered. General equilibrium  simulations  of the effects of trade and
other liberalising reforms would also be useful in order to get some idea of the broad effects on
production, exports, imports, employment,  etc of various reform packages. But as with all studies
involving computer  modelling, it will be essential to ensure that the underlying  mechanisms  of the
models are transparent and easily  understood , that the results make intuitive good sense, and that
the many guessed or guesstimated  parameters  which such models usually incorporate are realistic
and made explicit. Otherwise  the simulations  of 'black box'  models  are likely to be discounted  by
policy makers and they may do more harm than good to the process of policy reform.
31Ukely  IMIIcatlions  aad Safety  Nets
Based on comparisons  of domestic  and world prices prevailing  in 1992/93, the net effect of
implementing  the reform agenda we have suggested in this paper would probably be to raise the
overall level of agricultural prices by about 15 to 20 per cent.' 2 Cereal prices would possibly
increase by somewhat  more than this, but oilseed  prices (including  copra and coconut  oil) would  fall
substantially. Rubber prices would also fall.  The prices of pulses would not change very much.
Based on the  rather atypical relationship  between domestic and world prices in this year, sugar
prices would also remain about  the same, but would fall substantially  if more normal relationships
had prevailed. Cotton prices could  go up by about  20 per cent.
This is likely to be the broad scenario assuming  no major changes take place in the global
policies  influencing  international  agricultural  markets.  But agricultural  protection  and subsidy  policies
are being actively discussed around the world, particularly in the context of the GATr Uruguay
round negotiations and as part of the trade liberalisation  process which is under way in many
individual  developing  countries. The most optimistic  outcome for the liberatisation  of agricultural
trade in the GATr  negotiations  would be implementation  of the  Dunkel draft proposals, which
would require tariffication of  import barriers,  a  reduction of  36%  in  average import tariff
equivalents,  the same  percentage  reduction in export  subsidies, and a reduction of 20% in domestic
support measures. This would apply  to developed  ecuntries and to developing  country members  of
GATr, excent that the reductions  by the latter would  be only two thirds of the reductions  in OECD
countries. Least developed  couitries, however, are not required to make any reductions, and there
is no proposal for the removal Df negative  protection,  which remains the predominant  pattern in
developing  countries.
The  effects  on  world  prices  of  implementing the  Dunkel  proposals  have  been
comprehensively  modelled  by Brandao  and Martin (1993), and they have also considered  the effects
of two other plausible  reforms, notably  reductions  in the US land set aside  programs, and reductions
in negative  protection. 4 3 The results of all these exercises  are that international  prices increase, but
by not very much, from the baseline levels (1985-87)  used in the models.  For example: wheat,
+1% to +6% ; rice, -5% to +2%; coarse grains +2% to +4%; sugar +6% to + 12%; oilseeds
and puses  -TI% to +5%; cotton +1% to +4%.  These changes  are much smaller  than the changes
predicted  by earlier studies, and axe  more realistic in assuming  partial liberalisation  only, compared
to complete  liberalisation  assumed  in most of the earlier models."  Their relevance  for India is that
if it liberalises  its own agricultural  trade, liberalisation  in the rest of the world is likely to give only
a very modest further upward push to the general level of its domestic agricultural  prices, and in
fact world prices of rice would faU slightly. The resulting changes in relative world prices would
have a negligible effect on India's comparative  advantage in different crops as indicated by the
differences  between domestic  prices and world prices during the 1980s  and now.
Even though this suggests  that independent  changes  in policies of other countries affecting
world agricultural markets are not likely to affect India very much, the impact of the domestic
reform agenda for India's own trade, regulatory and other policies affecting agriculture would be
very substantial. This raises some fundamental  questions;  for example, what would be the impact
of the reforms on vulnerable,  low income  groups, on employment  conditions,  on farm incomes  and
on regional imbalances,  etc.?  Satisfactory  answers  to these  pertinent questions  requires much  more
rigorous analysis than has been attempted  by us.  Nevertheless, the broad effects are fairly clear.
Indicating them  may help in thinking about what needs to be known in more detail, and what
precautionary  measures might be taken to preempt adverse  fall outs of the reforms.
Cotton producers and most farmers with marketable surpluses of grains will gain despite
having to pay higher prices for their inputs. The oilseed  belt of India, particularly  Gujarai, will face
structural adjustments  in its cropping  patterns and edible oil industry, and the substitution  of coarse
32ccreals and pulses for ollseeds  is likely to reduce  farmer incomes. However  thX  expaulnon  of cotton
production  could compense or more than compensa for this loss.  In the south,  notably  in
Kerala,  Incomes  derived  from rubber  and from coconut/copra  production  will decline,  but will be
of&et  by higher  rotuns from rice  and from spices,  tea and coffee.
In the  aggregate,  agriculture  will  be more  remunerative  than  at  present,  awacfting  Investment
by farmers  as well  as by industrialists  (particularly  in processing  activities). Rising  exports  and
easler  access  to imported  Inputs  can  be expected  to induce  Innovations  in production  processes  and
to increase  ylelds.  Exportable  agricultural  crops  derive  their  comparative  advantage  primarily  from
their high labour intensity  and the fact that they have experienced  technological  break-throughs
(cotton,  rice, tobacco,  fruits and vegetables,  fisheries,  etc). and in general agriculture  is more
employment  intensive  than manufacturing.  For these reasons  the switching  of resources  from
manufacturing  to agriculture  will increase  the economywide  rate of growth  of employment.  The
labor  intensity  of agriculture  and  of the general  economy  will  increase  further  if credit  subsidies  are
reduced  and especiaUy  If electricity  and canal  water  are priced  so as to reflect  their opportunity
costs, or if efficient  systems  for trading  water  rights  are established.  If not offset  by increases  in
output  prices, these  changes  will induce  farmers  to cut back  the cultivation  of particularly  water
intensive  crops such as sugar cane.  This will indirecty reduce the demand  for investment  in
electricity  production  and distribution  and In irrigation, and free up resources  for other uses
Including  the completion  and  better  maitenance of existing  irrigation  commands  and other  badly
needed  more  productive  investments  in rural  areas.
There are potentially  difficult  adjustment  problems,  however,  for vulnerable  low income
groups  with incomes  below  the poverty  line who will be hurt by increased  food prices and for
subsistence  farmers  who  will be squeezed  by higher  prices  for inputs  such  as water,  electricity  and
fertiliser  but who  wiUl  not  benefit  from  the higher  prices  for marketable  production.  High  priority
wiUl  have  to be given  to these  problems  if the reforms  in agriculture  are to succeed.
In this regard,  as discussed  previously,  the present  methods  of distributing  subsidised  food
through  the PDS  need  to be drastically  changed  and evenaually  even  replaced  altogether  by a food
stamp  system. It Is well  known  that  the existing  system  suffers  from large  leakages,  and  that  ration
cards  are available  to the whole  population  regardless  of income,  thereby  providing  large  subsidies
to middle  and  high income  households  for which  there is no conceivable  justification,  while  large
portions  of the really  poor  are served  inadequately  or not  at all (Ahluwalia,  1992;  Howes  and  Jha,
1992). As a first step  towards  targetng, the government  has recently  initiated  an 'area approach
in which  1700  poor  blocks  have  been idendfied  in which  a revamped  PDS  is being  run.  We feel
that this is a step  in the right  direction.  But  one obvious  and  easily  implementable  reform  has not
yet been  introduced  i.e the removal  of easily  identifiable  wealthy,  middle  income  and not-so-poor
people  from the system. One  easy way  to identify  such  people  would  be through  their expenditure
patterns  or possessions  ,such as those  having  telephones  and/or  petrol driven vehicles  which  are
registered  in some  place. The food  subsidy  saved  on account  of these  people  could  be put back  into
the system  to reach  a larger  proportion  of the  real  poverty  groups  and  to increase  the extent  to which
they are subsidised.
A second  safety net for vulnerable  groups,  ar4  in particular  for marginal  subsistence
farmers4  who  wiUl  be squeezed  by the reforms  we have  proposed,  are rural employment  programs
like the Maharashtra  employment  guarantee  scheme  and the central  government's  Jawar Rojgar
Yojna  (JRY)  program. Besides  providing  employment,  these  can  be used  to build  badly  needed  rural
infrastructure.  The JRY received  a substantal  increase  in its funding  In the 1993/94  budget,  but
drastic  reforms  to cut leakages  and a substantial  further  expansion  would  be needed  if it is to have
a noticeable  nation-wide  impact. The principle  on which  these  programs  ought  to operate  is to be
self selecing  as safety  nets  by offering  work  at somewhat  below  the prevailing  rural  wage. Various
33proposals  Lave  been made for their reform  and expansion,  including an idea for a very large"
contractual  land  army which  would  organise  unemployed  workers  and farmers  from  uneconomic
plots into platoon  size bands which  would  construct  roads, canals,  buildings  etc In rural areas.'
It has been suggested  that the financig of such a scheme  could  come fom  the cortractlon  of
schemes  such as the integrated  rural developmen  program, which  are replete  with well known
problems,  and  from  the  revenues  which  would  become  available  with  the gradual  reduction  of input
subsidies  in the rural sector.
The concept  of schemes  such  as these  is attractive  while  there  is unemploymant  and  distress
in country areas, but they suffer from the serious  disadvantage  that the beneficlaries  of the
infrastructure  they  create  do not  pay, or do not  fully  pay for it. From this  perspective  it would  be
better  to find ways  of provdWing  construction  funds  to local authorities  and for them  to  choose  the
projects  and pay for it to be done  by private  contractors.  In this  way  mipioyment  is provided  and
there  is a better  link between  the work  and  its usefulness  to the local  people. There would  still  be
a need  for safety  net employment  schemes,  but  their  required  scope  would  be less. However,  if the
resources  are mobilised  by the central  government,  it would  have to be willing  to channel  them
through  state  governments  to local  jurisdictions  and to give  up detailed  control  on how  ihe money
is spent. This raises issues  of the relations  between  central  government,  state  and local finances
which  go well  beyond  the scope  of this  paper."
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37ENDNOTES
1. For a discussion  of Idia's  trade policies  up to 1990  se  Purel  (19).  A more deilod  summary
of the current  controls  over  agricultural  imports  and  exports  is given  In Gulati  and  Sharma  (1991).
2.1he 46% of manu ctui'mg  value  added  stil protected  by non-  tariff  barrier is mainly  due to the
condmting  ban on the import  of  a  ctred  consumer  goois .Ihe estimates  are based  on GDP
weWs calculated  from  the 1985/86  national  accounts  sad the 1985/86  AnnualSur=fIndusie
, Esimated tradeable  GDP is about 50 percent  of total GDP , after excluding  the major non-
tradeable  sectors  from  GDP  as well  a  no-  taable  advities within  generally  tradeable  sectors  (
for example  , repair services  were excluded  from m  GDP ).The pre-eform share  of
manufacht  value-added  protected  by non-tariff  barriers  is based  on an esdmate  of production
potentially  subject  to compedtion  from -OGL-  (Open  Generad  Licese ) imports  .In  practice  various
other restrictions  applied  to such imports  ( e.g. the "Actual  User"  condition  ) which limited
poteal  import  competition  in varying  degrees.  On the other  hand , allowance  was not made  for
imports  under  special  import  licences  used  by exporters  ( replenishment  and  advance  licences)  which
permitted  limited  import  competition  for some  manufacturers  . No allowance  was  made  for Reserve
Bank  of India  foreig exchange  restrictions  which  were  introduced  to deal  with  the  foreign  payments
crisis  which  began  in 1990.  These  had been  removed  by April  1992.
3.The  public  distribution  system  uses  ration cards  to distribute  rice,  wheat,  sugar and edible  oils
at  subsidised  prices  through  about  350,000  "fair  price  shops  ". For a recent  discussion  see  Ahluwalia
(1993 ).
4.See  Ahluwalia  (1993).
5.In UP , the levy  system  applied  to modern  sugar  mills  and  other  detailed  controls, including  low
controlled  soiling  prices  of molasses  and  price  and  other  controls  applied  to their  purchases  of sugar
cane,  have  permitted  the existence  of large  mumbers  of small  , high cost  producers  of 'khandsari  '(
an inferior  type  of sugar).7he  khandsari  unib are in practice  free of all taxes  and  regulatory  controls
, including  the labor  laws .
6.This  section  summarises  some  of the  research  results  described  in Gulati  with  Hanson  and  Pursell
(1990),  Gulati  and P.K. Sharma  (1991)  and Gulati  and  Pursell  (1992  ).
7.1he average  NPCs  are weighted  by production  at world  prices. They  are taken from Gulati  sad
Pursell  (1992  ). The NPC esimes  for mnuf  are in turn from unpublished  research  by
Pursell  and PurseJI  and  Kishor.  The  NPCs  for agriculture  are on the importable  hypothesis  i.e. for
all the commodities  included  in the aggregation,  domestic  prices at the farm are compared  with
estimates  of what those prices would  have been  had domestic  production  been competing  wh
imports.  The products included  are wheat, rice, sugarcane, groundnut, rapeseed/mustard,
sunflowerseed,  soyabeans,  gram,  rubber  and  cotton.  These  account  for about  60  percent  of the  value
of Indian  agricultura  production.  The  principal  products  omitted  are coarse  grains,  other  oilseeds
including  cocomnt/copra,  other pulses, jute, coffee, tea, cocoa, spices, tobacco  and fuit  and
vegetables. On average,  the nomina protecon of the omitted  products  was probably  about  zero:
hence their inclusion  would  probably  increase  the average  for agricultural  as a whole, but only
slightly.
388.Since the NPC is defined as P/P,,the  numerator is adjusted by the price equivalent  of the tax or
subsidy.Thus  the adjusted NPC is Pd(1-t)/P,. P, 4 P, and t are respectively  the domestic price, the
reference (adjusted  border) price, and the net income and corporate tax paid per unit of output. The
latter was calculated  as the difference  between the estimated economy-wide  ratio of income plus
corporate taxes to GDP, and the ratio of these taxes to value added in manufacturing  and agriculture
respectively. Since the taxes were not paid by agriculture, the difference was treated as a subsidy
and added to the nunerator.  The tax rate for manufacturing was higher than the economywide
average and was deducted from the numerator.
9.These are the broad results of as yet unpublished  research by Nalin Kishor.  According  to this,
between 1980/81 and 1987/88 the free trade exchange  rate was generally about half way between
the black market rate reported in the World Currency Yearbook (Pick's) and the exchange rate
implied  by the difference  between  the London  and the Bombay  price of gold. His estimate  of the free
trade exchange rate assumes  a sustainable  current account deficit of 1% of GNP and simulates  the
abolition  of QRs on imports and exports as well as the abolition  of import duties and export taxes
and subsidies. The estimates  are of course sensitive  to the assumptions  on export and import demand
elasticities.
10. The results of these 18 studies are summarised  in Schiff and Valdes (1992).
11. The export controls  referred to here are given in the official LXDort  and  mport Policy volume
(Ministry of Commerce)  for the period April 1 1992 to March 31 1997, as amended up to March
31, 1993. A large number  of products were removed from the various restricted lists in 1993, but
the most important  of these in terms of actual exports or export potential were "allowed freely
subject to the terms and conditions  specified  in the Public Notice". While cutting the apparent size
of the published  restricted lists, this has reduced the transparency  of the control system and could
have increased  or reduced the restrictiveness  of export controls,  depending  on the conditions  written
into the public notices.
12. The origins and functions  of the Coffee Board are discussed in a study by Ramachandran  and
Ray (1991).  According  to them, the controls which it implements  were introduced in 1942 as a
temporary  wartime measure  of market  support, but'  much  after the original  purpose ceased  to exist,
the provisions  got distorted  so as to provide  for a virtual monopoly  for the marketing  of the produce
of the industry ... perhaps to sustain the bureaucratic edifice which was built around the original
purpose '.  They argue that the system greatly reduces net returns to coffee growers, removes
incentives  for quality improvement, and impedes the development  of effective marketing both in
export markets and in the domestic  market.  Among  other things, the controls  were used to manage
India's export quotas under the various international  coffee agreements,  and also the 'Rupee trade"
with the Soviet  Union and with various  East European  countries. Neither of these fimctions  required
compulsory monopoly procurement by the Coffee Board, however.  In any event, the latest
international coffee agreement was suspended in  July  1989, and  the  Rupee trade  has now
disappeared.
13. As an eample,  complex and potentially  highly distortionary export controls and export taxes
are applied to exports of hides and skins and leathers with the aim of subsidising  the export of the
more highly processed products in this processing chain. Decisions on whether to  export the
intermediate product (e.g. tanned leather) or a product involving further processing (e.g.  shoe
uppers) should be on the basis of processing and other costs in relation  to export  prices and should
39not be artificially  skewed in favor of further processing. Among  other things, with export controls
and/or export taxes which decline  according to the degree of processing, there is a serious danger
that the net foreign exchange earned  by exporting some of the processed products in the chain will
be negative or at least very low in relation to processing, marketing  and other costs.
14. Apart from agricultural protection, anti-dumping  actions have become the major protectionist
device in developed countries in recent years, and are being used with increasing frequency in
developing  countries  which  have removed  or reduced explicit  quantitative  import controls  and tariffs.
See Finger (1993 ).
15. For the three year period ending 1991-92,  the average nominal  protection  coefficient  (NPC) for
groundnut  oil was 1.80, for rapeseed-mustard  oil 2.72, for sunflower  seed oil 2.66, and for soyabean
oil 2.66. The protection levels would be much higher if the domestic prices of these oils were
compared with the price of imported  palm oil (see Gulati and Sharma, 1993).
16. In 1986, India was importing  about 30 per cent of its requirements  of edible oils.  In that year
the government  set up the Technology  Mission  on Oilseeds (TMO)  with the aim of achieving  self-
sufficiency  in edible oils by 1990. The TMO in turn formed four 'micro-missions' to assault the
problem from aU directions, including  seed technology, processing, marketing  and pricing.  But by
the end of 1988, the TMO was nowhere near its goal of self sufficiency. So in January 1989, it
persuaded  the government  to steeply  increase  the prices of edible oils and oilseeds. The basic means
for achieving  this was by cutting back on imports of edible oils by STC (the canalising  agency).
This started taking away area from other crops, even on irrigated  lands.  By the end of 1992, India
became almost self sufficient in edible oils.  The import bill came down from more than Rs 1000
crores (about $US 800 million)  in the mid 1980s  to less than Rs 100 crores ($US  3 million)  in 1992-
93. But this was at the expense  of cereal production,  which stagnated  or even declined. In 1992-93,
this forced the government  to import three million  tonnes of wheat at a price much higher than the
procurement  price offered to Indian farmers.
17. A bilateral preferential  arrangement  of this kind would narrow international  markets in both rice
and edible oils.  The mechanisms  to ensure the agreed bilateral exchanges  (continued  canalisation,
import and export licensing, preferential tariffs etc.) are highly distortionary. Above all, there is
a serious danger that arrangements of this kind that are intended to  be temporary will build
constituencies  which wil  make them difficult  to remove, so that they become permanent  obstacles
to further liberalisation.
18. These margins are estimates  only, since during the 1980s there were no exports and in most
years no imports  of wheat  and common  (non-basmati)  rice.  The low percentage  cif/fob  gap for rice
results from the assumption  that imported rice would have come the relatively  short distance from
Bangkok while exports would have gone to Asian markets at fob prices equal to fob prices in
Bangkok for equivalent  quality rice.  By contrast, imported wheat was assumed  to come from the
U.S. gulf, while it was assumed  that exported  India" wheat would have competed  with US wheat
in the Middle East at fob prices in Bombay  equal to U.S. gulf fob prices. Another more general
explanation is that the per ton international  prices for rice are considerably  higher than the per ton
international  prices of wheat, and so freight rates and Indian port and domestic transport costs tend
to be lower in relation to prices.  The estimated  price gaps in Punjab are made on the assumption
that if rice and wheat  were imported, the prices in Punjab would be determined  by the landed prices
40in the ports  imnus  traport  and  other  co  to  the  ports. This estimated  import  reference  price is
obviously  sensitive  to where  the competlom  between  imported  and  Punjab  wheat  would  take  place.
See Gulati,  Hanson  and Pursell  (1990).
19. The Chilean  experience  with  price  bands  for wheat,  sugar  and  oilseeds  between  1977  and 1980
and  since 1983  is particularly  pertinent. Se  Vades (1992).  See  also  the simulations  of the effects
different  schemes  would  have  had in Veneuua (Coleman  and  Larson,  1991)  and  the discussion  of
a proposal  for a price  band  for Mexican  mie  (Larson  1993).
20. This  possibility  is discussed  in Larson  and Coleman  (1991).
21. The  importance  for agricultural  producdivity  in developing  countries  of freeing  up the import  and
deregulating  the domestic  production  of agricultural  inputs  is emphasised  by Gisselquist  (1993).
22. Under  India's  small  scale  industry  reservation  policy,  about  830  product  groups  are reserved  for
production  by small  scale  firms,  currently  defined  a  firms  with  assets  of less  than  Rs  6 million  (SUS
195,000  approximately).  Small  firms  are  also  supported  in other  ways,  including  by exemption  from
excise  taxes.
23. The Vaidyanathan  Committee  Report  go the Pricing  gf Irrigation  MWe. Government
of India, 1992)  gives  the following  state  avege  percentages  of water  charges  to the  gross  revenues
of irrigated  farms:
West  Bengal  0.1
Tamil  Nadu  0.1








Madhya  Pradesh  2.6
Rajasthan  2.7
Uttar  Pradesh  2.9
24. The report  of this committee  has not yet  been  published.  Is main  recommendations  have  been
summarised,  however,  by its chairman,  A.Vaidyaathan  (1993).
25. This would  require  that  the receipts  from  water  charges  go directly  to the irigation authority.
At present,  a major  problem is that  wat  clages go to the general  state revenue,  and  so there is
no direct connection  between  improved  efficiency  in collecdng  water  rates  and the availability  of
fimds  to improve  the operaton of the iroo  sysems.  Tis  undermines  both the motive  of
farmers  to pay water  charges,  and  the intt  of th  irrigation  command  staff  to collect  them.
26. These  conditions  are discussed  in Rosegrant  and Binswawger  (1993).
4127. Ihe  long-run marginal  cost of power generation  and distribution  is currently estimated  at about
RB  2/kwh, and is higher than this in rural aeas owing to the higher cost of distributing there.  But
the true opportnity  cost of electricity is best indicated  by the cost of generation from the standby
generators  used by practically  all large and medium  Indian  mancting  firms. This is usually  well
in excess of the marginal  cost of supplies from the grid. Even if farmers run their pumpsets in off-
peak hours at nght,  actual charges are a small fraction cf opportunity  costs.
28. In April 1992 the State Power Ministrs  agreed that they would all try to fix the rural power
tariff at a minimim of 50 paise/kwh  by March 1993. But this was actually  done only in four states-
Rajasthan, West Bengal, Orissa and Haryana.
29. As regards private sector participation  in generation, it is reported that the government has
agreed to guarantee a 16 per cent rate of return to private investors (in foreign exchange  to foreign
investors)  using a normative  cost- plus formula. There are many  problems with cost-plus  formulas
of this kind, as is illustrated  by the experience  in the fertiliser industry.
30. A comprehensive  discussion  of the long run reforms needed in the rural credit system is given
in Nickel and Khan (1993).
31. Ihe  195S Essendal Commodities  Act provides the legal basis for the central government's
extensive powers to control the prices of wessendial  commodities', which are defined to include
practically all agricultural commodities. It is also the basis for related powers, such as movement
controls, stock limits, the power to requisition trader's stocks, the licencing of traders by state
governments, and even production controls.  The economic  conditions and policies which were
followed during and after the time the Act was introduced are discussed in Rath and Patvardban
(1967).
32. During the markeding  season of 1992-93, informal restrictions were imposed  on the shipment
of wheat  out of Punjab and Haryana. As in past years, this was  done by instructing  Indian Railways
to reduce the wagons provided for wheat shipments  by private traders, and by police roadblocls
which prevented or hindered wheat shipments  by truck.  In addition, under the implied  threat that
they might otherwise risk losing their liceDses,  private traders were 'advised' not to bid in the
prnmary  markets. In response, the Bhartiya Kisan Union (BKU) organised a one week farmers'
boycott of mandis (i.e. markets)  as a protest against these coercive measures aimed at depressing
open market prices.  Many farmers held back their produce with the hope of selling in the lean
season, while  many traders tried to 'smuggle' wheat  to markets  in Delhi  by bribing  the enforcement
agencies at state borders.  As a result, the overall procurement  of wheat dropped from 11 million
tonnes in 1991-92  to 6.3S million  tonnes in 19923,  despite  the fact that wheat  production  was more
or less the same in both years.
33. The "bulk line paid out cost'  Is the marginal  out-of- pocket cost of producing  the bulk of the
wheat.  That is, if all wheat producers are ranked in ascending order of out-of-pocket costs per
quintal, the bulk -line-  paid out cost might be the paid out cost of the farm at the 70th percentile in
terms of total production. Since ths cost excludes the imputed costs of owned  factors of production
such a  land, labour and capital, the bulk line paid out cost is sigrificantly  lower than the cost C3,
which is presently calculated by the Directorate of Economics and Statistics in the Ministry of
Agriculture and is one of the bases for fixing  procurement  prices.
4234. Farmers in Punjab and Haryana, where previoudy sunflower  had not been cultivated  at all, are
rapidly moving into this and other crops that offer high returns. In Punjab, for instance, the area
under sunflower is expected to be  150,000 ha. in 1992-93 gainst about 80,000 ha in  1991-92,
mainly at the cost of late sowing  wheat in the cotton belt.
35. A levy on rice mills has also recently  been introduced  in Karataka  and Maharashtra.
36. The very large difference  between  the levy and free market prices leads to large scale evasion
and corruption  and has induced  many sugar mills to set up their own alcohol distilleries  in order to
use their molasses (utput, even though the distilleries would be unprofitable  if they could sell the
molasses at the free market price.
37. In 1992, in the aggregate, sugar mills made losses of about Rs 700 crores (approximately  SUS
25 million)  and payments  arrears to sugar cane growers were Rs 500 crores (about  SUS 18 millon).
38. Since this was written, it has been reported  that the molasses  levy has been abolished  (tEnoMi
Timesi, June 10, 1993).
39. In 1993  the government  raised the issue price of sugar from Rs 6.90/kg to Rs 8.30/kg. At going
open market prices, this increase was about sufficient  to eliminate  most of the subsidy element  to
consumers of PDS sugar, and was likely to divert many consumers  from the PDS network.  This
situation provides an opportunity  to eliminate  sugar from the PDS altogether.
40. For a discussion  of the aggregate  supply response of agriculture to policy changes, see Schiff
and Valdes (1992) Chapter  4, and Binswanger  (1989).
41. If the capital inflow is a portfolio  adjustment  by investors  who have previously  withdrawn  their
money  or more generally have been deterred from investiDg  in the country, normal capital inflows
at a reduced rate would  be expected  to resume  once the adjustment  is complete.  If the capital  inflow
is a speculative move to take advantage  of high interest rates in the liberalising  country, it will
eventually  move  out and in the process precipitate  a devaluation  once the high interest rates decline.
Finally, if the liberalisation  indeed attracts a permanent and significant increase in capital inflow,
the capital inflow itself is likely to directly  or indirecdy increase  the savings  available  for investment
in  the economy, including investment in agriculture.  This  could offset, or  pardy offset the
contractionary effect on agriculture of the stronger local currency that such a permanent inflow
would support.
42. This is a rough estimate  based on the nominal protection  coefficients  of these crops in the year
1992-93. It takes no account of the likely effects of changes  in the Indian net export supply or net
import demand  on the world prices of rice and sugar. It also does not allow for general equilibrium
effects in production and demand which would determine whether cif import prices or fob export
prices would determine domestic  prices.
43. There has been  substantial  progress  in reducing  negative  protection  in many  developing  countries
(including  China) in the course of trade reform programs implemed  over the past ten years or So.
Whereas the reduction of positive protection tends to  increae  world prices, reduclng negative
protection  increases supply and reduces  world prices. For exaple,  the reduction  of rice protection
in countries such as Japan, Korea and Indonesia would increase world prices, but reducing the
43substantial  discrimination  against rice production  in China and India would reduce world prices. In
most of the Brandao and Martin simulations, as well as in earlier models, this effect predominates
as regards rice.
44. The results of some of the earlier models  are reported in Gulati and Sharma (1992)  and are also
summarised  by Brandao and Martin (1993).
45. According  to the land holding census  of 1985-86, the number of marginal  and small holdings
(below 2 hectares) ae  three quarters of the total  nber  of holdings in India, but only account for
one quarter of the total area held.  Many of these small holdings are economically  unviable and
vulnerable  to changes in the rural economy, including  increases in input prices as proposed in this
paper. Safety  net programs, including  rural employment  schemes  are needed  for the people who rely
on them.
46. The labour employed on a contractual basis would be given training on army lines for the
construction  of roads, buildings, canals, etc. This army of construction  workers could  be organised
in bands of 25 each, with two persons running the kitchen. The construction  activities undertaken
would be chosen from requests by district or block authorities, and the army workers would move
in at specified  times to do the jobs.  They would  be given minimum  wages with susidised  food, and
allowed  to visit their families  for say a month in a year (Gulati, 1989).
47. The financing aspects  of employment  programs are discussed  in Mundle (1992).
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